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ABSTRACT
In recent years, unprecedented numbers of migrants have arrived in Italy due to political,
religious, ethnic and economic instabilities in West and North Africa and the Middle East.
Simultaneously, the Eurozone Crisis and neoliberal austerity measures left the Italian
government struggling to administer healthcare and legal services to all migrants. This study
investigates the provision of essential services by the Italian state and two non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), Emergency and ARCI, respectively providing free medical and legal
services, to incoming migrants in Siracusa, Italy. It analyzes migrants’ perceptions of these
services and evolving goals in Europe. Building upon preliminary fieldwork conducted in 2014,
in January to July 2015 I undertook six months of participant observation in a migrant reception
center and legal offices in Siracusa. During my research I conducted 72 unstructured and semistructured interviews with migrants, NGO activists, lawyers, and doctors, and state physicians.
This study analyzes Emergency’s role as an entrance to the Italian healthcare system and ARCI
as a facilitator of legal aid to migrants. I argue that the clinic’s position on the outskirts of
Siracusa functions as a means of exclusion, exacerbating divides between the local population
and incoming migrants. Additionally, I provide insight into the provision of legal services to
migrants in Siracusa, as well as how these migrants navigate geopolitical and legislative borders,
and these borders’ roles within the politics of the European Union and neoliberal ideologies. I
argue that selective enforcement of asylum legislation and dearth of legal aid to migrants
motivates many migrants to clandestinely flee Italy to seek futures in other European nations,
consequently moving “burdens” of migrant reception. This research contributes to public policy
and scholarship on health and migration policy as well as politics of conflict, while shedding
light on the critical role of NGOs in a complex humanitarian crisis occurring in Southern Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, over 170,000 migrants landed in Italy in 2014
(Ministero dell’Interno 2015a). In 2015, 1,011,712 migrants crossed the Mediterranean to reach
Europe, resulting in 3,695 deaths, compared to over 3,000 deaths and 280,000 arrivals in 2014.
Although the majority of arrivals took place in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean (801,919),
the vast majority of deaths (2,889) were migrants crossing from North Africa to Italy in the
Central Mediterranean (International Organization for Migration 2015). The significantly higher
number of fatalities across this area is likely due to the significantly larger portion of water
migrants must cross in the area. This increase in deaths is attributable to the end of Mare
Nostrum, a migrant rescue operation in the Mediterranean conducted primarily by the Italian
Coast Guard. The European Union (EU) ended this program toward the end of 2014 after they
deemed it too expensive. The EU replaced the program with Triton, a program with less
geographic reach and funding, although in April 2015, reacting to the large death toll, the EU
increased funds to Triton (Yardley 2015).
The migrants coming into the EU are from North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, and
the Middle East and are fleeing war, poverty, and general violence. The Arab Spring and
resulting conflicts have displaced millions of people, most notably in Syria, where there are 7.6
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the ongoing Syrian Civil War (UNHCR
2015a). There is also a high number of IDPs in Nigeria, where conflicts between the government
and armed forces (some affiliated with ISIS) have produced 1.4 million IDPs (UNHCR 2015c).
Similarly, there are significant populations of displaced persons in Somalia, South Sudan, and
Sudan (1.1 million, 1.6 million, and 2.3 million, respectively) because of famine, flooding, and
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militia activity (UNHCR 2015b). Collectively, UNHCR estimates that in 2014 there were 38.2
million IDPs worldwide, and 19.5 million refugees 1 (UNHCR 2014). Further, the deposing of
Muammar Gaddafi, former leader of Libya, has left the country in an ongoing war between
various militias and without a centralized government. As a result, people smugglers can operate
in Libya unfettered, paving the way for those seeking a new life to attempt their crossing to
Europe for the price of 1,000-2,000 USD (Sommerville 2015). Migrants passing through Libya
are often the victims of violence, torture, and sexual assault. For those arriving in Sicily, Libya is
the primary point of departure. This combination of globally displaced persons, anarchy in
Libya, and the fact that many of Europe’s borders are seas, has led to the exodus of persons from
the Global South to Europe.
Southern Europe, which has disproportionately suffered from the Eurozone crisis and
subsequent neoliberal austerity policies (Popadopolous and Roumpakis 2015), are the primary
points of arrival for migrants due to their geographic proximity to the countries of origin.
Austerity measures such as these, which critics claim “[lead] to indirect, destructive taxation,
large cuts in public spending and the destruction of the welfare state, especially in the areas of
health, education, and social security … facilitate the investment of powerful and colonialist
economic forces” (Tsipras 2015:vii). These measures most strongly impact the marginalized
members of society and consequently migrants arriving in Europe and come as a result of the
Eurozone Crisis, the name given to the severe increase in unemployment and downturn in
economic activity that resulted from the worldwide 2008 Great Recession. This event, in the
words of political scientist Nathaniel Copsey (2015:4), has “[exacerbated] – and perhaps even
1

The primary difference between IDPs and refugees is that refugees have crossed an international border, while
IDPs have not (UNHCR 2010).

2

[exaggerated] – pre-existing, long-standing, and deep-rooted issues that cut across Europe’s
social, political, and economic spheres.” Citizens of Southern European countries feel they did
not vote for these measures and consequently are increasingly unsatisfied with the ongoing
politics within the region (Copsey 2015). In a September 2015 referendum, the EU agreed to
begin a program to redistribute 120,000 migrants across member states to attempt to alleviate the
heavy burden on Italy and Greece. However, there is no set quota for the number of migrants
each member state must accept, and several governments, including that of Hungary, the UK,
and Denmark, Slovakia, Romania, and the Czech Republic attempted to oppose the redistribution
(European Council 2015). As a result of the EU overturning this opposition, the Slovakian and
Hungarian governments threatened legal action against the EU in December 2015 (Lopatka
2015).
As a product of the over one million migrants that arrived in Europe in 2015, several EU
Member States, including Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, and France
have temporarily suspended free movement across their borders, prompting an amendment to the
Schengen Agreement (an EU treaty allowing free movement across several nation-states’
borders) to allow such action (BBC 2016b). This move, unimaginable just a few years ago, is
part of the changing political environment of Europe in the face of austerity and large-scale
immigration. Furthermore, Germany and Austria have both started to turn back migrants crossing
their borders. In a move that, according to BBC (2016b), “has drawn comparisons to” Nazi
Germany’s treatment of its Jewish population, Denmark has ruled that police can seize valuables
worth more than 1,340 EUR from migrants to compensate for services the Danish government
provides. In the words of a Danish Parliament member, the move aims to “make Denmark a little
bit less attractive compared to other European countries that people seek asylum in” (NPR 2016).
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Additionally, in February 2016, Austria introduced a cap on the number of accepted asylum
applications, allowing only 80 per day. The European Migration Commissioner has described the
move as “plainly incompatible” with European law (BBC 2016a). It remains to be seen what
explicit measures the other governments of EU Member States will undertake in order to make
their respective nations “a bit less attractive” for migrants and how/if this will affect the
movement of migrants arriving in Europe.
Local reactions in Europe have ranged from hostilities to warm welcome toward migrants
(Fernandez 2015; Martin 2015; Michaelski 2015) - a spectrum that is reflective of Italy as well.
For example, Riace, a town lauded for its reception of migrants, has welcomed them with
housing, classes, and employment opportunities (Kington 2013; Sunderland 2014), while
elsewhere migrants (and those helping them) have been the target of stabbings, shootings,
divisive political rhetoric, and organized crime threats. Attitudes towards migrants in Europe are
becoming increasingly negative after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and reported
sexual harassment and assaults in Cologne allegedly committed by Middle Eastern and North
African migrant men in December 2015 (Hume and Yan 2016). Local reactions have included
protests and further violence against migrants.
On the political level, the influx of migrants has in part led to and fueled an increase in
activity and popularity in far-right groups in France, Greece, Italy, Germany, Hungary, and
others (Horvat 2015a). All the while, leftist parties simultaneously have come to the fore,
particularly in the case of Greece, where SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς; the
Coalition of the Radical Left) has come to power based on the promise of refusing further
austerity measures (this has not yet come to pass) (Žižek 2015). Consequently, the subject of
migration in the Mediterranean is not only an issue of immigration law and human rights, but
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also one that calls into question consequences of economic policies, international relations,
ongoing instabilities in West and North Africa, and the future of the EU as a whole.
In this thesis, I will begin by reviewing relevant scholarship on refugees and migration.
Although this is a well-researched and prolific field, current research has not addressed the
asylum reception process of migrants in primary reception centers in Italy. Consequently, there is
presently a gap in information on a major step of the reception process for migrants. Thus, this
study contributes to the anthropology of migration and humanitarianism by shedding light on a
previously unstudied moment in migrant reception. Further, policy makers can use information
from this study to inform policy, facilitating the efficient provision of services to migrants. This
thesis also explores gaps between policy and practice, demonstrating the on-the-ground realities
of international legislation related to the reception of migrants in Italy. Further, by looking at the
perspectives of migrants, NGO workers, and other local actors and policy implementers, I am
able to explore multiple viewpoints related to migration into Italy and thus have a holistic view
of the implementation and effects of policy.
This research project answers three questions.
1) How do NGOs and the state provide healthcare services to migrants?
2) How do migrants conceptualize and access these services?
3) How do migrants conceptualize “Europe” as a whole and how do their ideas change
over time?
After explaining my methodology, in Chapter One I describe legislative policies at the
UN, EU, Italian, and local level. Once I have explained these policies, I present the reality of the
enforcement of these laws. The execution of these laws, in the case of Siracusa and Umberto I, is
spotty at best and leaves several gaps in services. In Chapter Two, I explain how two local NGOs
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attempt to fill these gaps, and difficulties that these organizations have with local government
administrators, revealing further the poor enforcement of policy and mismanagement of Umberto
I. Chapter Three will analyze migrants’ perspectives of reception conditions, services, and the
migration process as they attempt to begin their lives anew in Europe. I argue that a result of the
aforementioned gaps and structural violence in the migrant reception apparatus, many migrants
choose to clandestinely flee reception centers, seeking a future further north in Europe. Chapter
Four will serve as my discussion, as I critically examine how migrants’ actions conform to
Sherry Ortner’s (2006) ideas of agency, Slavoj Žižek and Paul Farmer’s conceptualizations of
violence, and contextualize the reception of migrants within ideas of deservingness and the
European post-colonial environment. Finally, I conclude that the migration reception system in
Italy creates a mobile set of borders around migrants and pushes them further north, outside the
nation’s borders. Ultimately, I argue that ethnographic perspectives can provide a meaningful
insight into how governments can more effectively receive migrants and that vertical and that
horizontal cooperation among governments and NGOs is necessary to ameliorate this
humanitarian issue.

6

LITERATURE REVIEW

The scholarship on the topic of refugees and migration spans many disciplinary and thematic
areas. To offer background and contextualize the present study, of particular interest are areas of
scholarship that deal with refugee policy, structural factors shaping migrant experiences, and
mental health. Existing literature primarily focuses on both the experiences of refugees and the
way that legislation and refugee discourse has shaped migration. In Escape from Violence,
Zolberg, Suhrkey and Aguayo (1989) in particular present a detailed analysis of reasons for and
experiences of migrant(ion)s in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. They do not mention
any specific ethnographic data that their studies are based on. Citing “violence ... inflicted
indirectly through imposed conditions that make normal life impossible” (1989:33) as a result of
colonial structures and European exploitation of labor in the periphery for plantations and mines.
Zolberg et al. discuss how governments have bureaucratized the process of seeking
asylum and how the “prohibition of emigration” can be a means for the state to exercise control
over labor and dissent. Additionally, they frame all of these situations in a historical context
wherein they recount the history of asylum-seeking legislation in detail. The authors in particular
emphasize the World Wars as the reason for the creation of the legal category of “refugee” after
mass migrations within Europe and to the United States. This includes the creation of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 1951 Geneva Convention, detailed
below. Richard Black’s Fifty Years of Refugee Studies (2001) provides further depth to the
history of refugee scholarship and legislation.
The scholarship has thus far been very much shaped by the same sort of refugee
discourse that Zolberg et al. discuss, namely who is a refugee and why. Cvanjer and Sciortino
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make the important note that the field of irregular migration 2 “suffers not only from a lack of
reliable empirical data but also from endemic undertheorizing” (2010:389). The fact that
migrants with “low social and economic capita” are more visible and thus overrepresented in the
literature exacerbates this problem. They state the borders exist partially to preserve privilege
among natives and among certain classes. Cvanjer and Sciortino also comment on the discourse
of migration, stating that “irregular” migration only exists in terms of interactions with the state.
Friese and Mezzadra discuss how borders can be a reflection of economic asymmetries between
the core and periphery (2010). The two also apply Foucault’s theory of governmentality to the
situation, stating that “…governing no longer involves a delimited territory with spatially fixed
and sedentary populations, but the control of highly mobile, vagrant subjects and populations
‘menacing’ the order and the security of the states” (2010:311).
Fraser discusses how refugees are victims of social exclusion at the hands of global
power structures that benefit from the “gerrymandering” of political space (2010). An additional
example of the marginalization of refugees and irregular migrants is in Sarah Horton’s work on
differential healthcare access among Mexican irregular immigrants and Cuban refugees in
Albuquerque, New Mexico (2004). These two groups are at the mercy of the interpretation of
healthcare providers in terms of access to services. Healthcare workers contrast those with
refugee status (the Cubans) with those who are or workers perceive to be illegal immigrants
(individuals from Mexico). This exemplifies how refugees and migrants are at the mercy of

2

“Irregular” migration or “irregular” migrants refers to migrants who move across borders in what states view as
unconventional manners; that is, without documents.
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categorization by cultural identities and various power structures often framed in a neoliberal
worldview.
Nicholas Van Hear (1998) also thoroughly covers international refugee laws and explains
what drives people to seek asylum. This is primarily economic instability, violence political
systems, and sectarian/ethnic tensions that are often due to corrupt power structures that are
sometimes the result of colonial intervention. Aiwha Ong is another vitally important scholar in
refugee studies, discussing the institutionalization of refugee dependence in the US asylumseeking system for Cambodian refugees in California (2004). Ong argues that these refugees are
just as much actors expressing agency, as they are the subject of the actions of refugee legislation
and discourse, while also maintaining the dependency of some refugees is the result of the
asylum process itself.
These works together provide examples of how states strongly shape the discourse of the
refugees, as they not only define refugees but also decide who is a refugee based on their
experiences. This includes the important “economic migrant” category, which is created from
those the state deems to be seeking better economic opportunity and not necessarily an escape
from dangerous lives, which Zolberg et al. claim is an oversimplification (1989). Paul Farmer
(2004) also offers a critical analysis concerning the refugee reception policies of the United
States. The United States has consistently classified Haitian migrants as “economic migrants,” a
classification with ignores the structural violence inherent within the lives of Haitians. Haitians,
like many other people who seek asylum, face a variety of conditions that threaten their daily
lives such as exposure of disease, interacting with violent and corrupt governments and hardships
due to lack of economic opportunity. Farmer summarizes this well, saying, “Suffering ... is
seldom divorced from acts of the powerful” (2004:42).
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Anthropological research on migrants has demonstrated the importance of psychosocial
care, stability, and adequate provision of legal information for recent migrants (Grønseth 2011;
Lubkemann 2008; Ommeron et al. 2005; Perera et al. 2013; Trilling 2014; Van Hear 1998). This
is particularly relevant in the context of this paper, as migrants arriving in Italy often witness and
endure violence and torture. Instability is, in fact, the norm for migrants arriving in Italy, as
poorly enforced legal refugee protections and inadequate healthcare structures provide deficient
support. Additionally, anthropological research has recently begun to urge health professionals to
see migration as a determinant of health, as argued by Heide Castañeda et al (2015). Castañeda,
along with other public health and anthropological scholars demonstrated ethnographically that
migration itself often has effects and implications for the health of migrants around the globe.
Scholars such as Daniela DeBono (2012) take a more focused approach, examining in
particular Maltese perception of refugees and human rights and are critical of Maltese and
European migration legislation. She argues Maltese legislation ignores refugee rights as human
rights while European Legislation, in the scarcity of enforcement and in the underfunding of
Southern European states contributes to the dire situation of those seeking asylum. These states
in particular bear the brunt of asylum applications due to the Dublin III Regulation, which states
that the nation where the asylum applicant first lands is the one that must deal with the
application. DeBono’s work provides ethnographic data that gives solid ground to her argument
that European migration legislation is ill enforced and thus does not adequately address
migrants’ needs. Silja Klepp (2010) also examines the present situation in Europe. Klepp reviews
how current refugee policy may undermine the policy of non-refoulement, which states that a
nation may not legally return a migrant to their home country if they face persecution, oppression
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or danger. Klepp also discusses how political deals between Italy and Libya endanger refugee
rights by increasing the ease with which the Italian state deports refugees.
Scholars also critique the aggressive policy of Frontex, the EU-wide border protection
agency operationalized during the beginning of the migration crisis in 2011, for seizing refugees
in the Mediterranean and deporting them before they have the opportunity to request asylum,
often operating outside the legal framework in which the UN and EU created it (Friese 2012;
Klepp 2012; Nascimbene and Di Pascale 2011). It was also at this time that the Italian
government initially requested financial assistance from the EU and called for reform of the
European immigration system. The Italian government, especially when headed by former Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, signed treaties during the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring,
when Italy became increasingly concerned about migrants crossing the Mediterranean (Friese
2012; Nascimbene and Di Pascale 2011). 3 Klepp also discusses the “street-level bureaucrats”
who influence formal legislation and migration policy through informal actions, that is, how
those who are actually supposed to carry out the refugee legislation often can change the
legislation itself.
Heidrun Friese, a German anthropologist, is another researcher working in European
Migration. She examines how new economies have sprung up in areas with large numbers of
refugees and how borders are a “means of exclusion” (Friese 2012:67). Damian Spiteri (2013) is
another anthropologist who has addressed the present refugee situation in Southern Europe,
though his particular focus was on how Maltese children perceive refugee children. According to
Spiteri, Maltese children are initially hostile but then after a proper education are sympathetic
and welcoming to the migrant children, smoothing their adjustment to Maltese school life.

3

For more information on particular legislative agreements between Italy and Libya, as well as Italy and Egypt, see
Nascimbene and Di Pascale (2011).
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Sociologist Btihaj Ajana has also conducted research on migrants in Europe, particularly within
the context of state surveillance and biometric control. Ajana argues that the mandatory
biometric identification that migrants undergo upon arrival into Europe is similar to
identification measures imposed upon criminals. Thus, the state declares “a form of sovereign
exception, or at least performatively resuscitating a ‘spectral sovereignty’ within the field of
governmentality” (Ajana 2013:587). Thus, migrants, mindful of this state surveillance, may be
frightened into becoming “good” citizens. Anthropologist Nicholas Harney, further building
upon ethnographic research on migrants in Europe, conducted ethnographic work in Naples,
Italy, demonstrating the importance of mobile phones and digital communication for migrants, ,
in addition to using phones as a means to stay updated about their legal status in Italy.
Powerfully, Harney (2013:553) argues, “the presence of the migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee
further unsettles citizens of wealthier-nation states” because the presence of these marginalized
persons “undermine the glib rhetoric of exuberant promoters of an unfettered and lightly
regulated global capital.” In other words, the visible presence of migrants in Europe serve as a
reminder of the displaced victims of the global economic system from which the West benefits.
As anthropologist Cristiana Giordano’s (2014) work on Italy’s migrants demonstrates,
the state narratives constrain and dehumanize migrants’ experiences as they seek legal protection
in the labyrinthine nature of the legal system. Italy and Greece in particular bear the brunt of
asylum applications due to the Dublin III Regulation, which requires that states where the
asylum applicant first enters is the one responsible for the application and migrants’ initial needs,
such as healthcare, legal counsel, housing, and food (DeBono 2012; Farmer 2013; Klepp 2010).
Cases concerning ill enforcement of policies have made their way to the European Court of
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Human Rights (ECHR), where the court ruled that, for example, Malta had denied rights to legal
counsel, medical services, and adequate housing. 4
Alice Farmer (2013), a researcher with Human Rights Watch, has documented the
experiences of children fleeing the Middle East and North Africa upon their arrival in Europe,
particularly Greece and Malta. Farmer shows how Greece and Malta are violating human rights
in their treatment of children, who these states often detained arbitrarily.
Historians have also done much to contextualize the present influx of refugees to Europe.
Schaebler (2013) and Fildis (2012) have done an excellent job explaining ethnic conflicts in
Syria, showing how colonialism has impacted sectarian tensions in Syria by intentionally placing
historically marginalized ethnoreligious groups such as the Druze and Alawite Muslims in a
superior position to the Sunni Muslims, who view the Druze and Alawites as infidels and
historically took advantage of their labor. This allowed the Alawites, who the French gave
majority control of the military, to later easily overthrow and oppress the Sunnis’ independent
Syrian government in 1963. The Alawites, placed once again in a subservient position to the
Sunnis, responded in kind by severely oppressing Sunni power and religious expression. These
tensions bounced on each other until the eruption of the Syrian Civil War in 2011.
These migration issues have also made their way to the European Court of Human
Rights, where asylum-seekers in Malta have sought legal recourse with a state that has violated
various basic human rights. The Court has cited numerous examples of Malta’s violation of EU
laws, which dictate right to legal counsel (in an understandable language), right to healthcare,
sanitary conditions, right to a fair and speedy hearing, right to quickly access information
4

The most visible human rights cases have been Aden Ahmed v Malta (Application No. 55352/12 2013) and Suso
Musa v Malta (Application no. 4337/12 2013).
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regarding the application process’s results and access to UNHCR lawyers, most of which are
effectively denied in Malta (Aden Ahmed v Malta Application No. 55352/12 2013, Council
Directive 2005/85/EC 2005, European Union 2013, Suso Musa v Malta Application no. 4337/12
2013). These cases overwhelmingly ruled that Malta had not carried out the appropriate asylum
procedures, denying the asylum-seekers many of these rights. The Maltese government was
ordered by the European Court of Human Rights to financially compensate both Suso Musa and
Aden Ahmed for emotional damages and the over one year each they spent in detention. The
individuals were still ultimately deported.
Ethnographic research conducted in second reception centers for migrants or in the
communities in which they subsequently live has informed scholarship concerning the migration
crisis in Europe. These data offer an understanding of how migrants make use of the facilities
and services provided by the state that are designed to help migrants find jobs, schooling, and in
general “adjust” to life in Italy. However, it does not offer the understanding of the legal
processes that bring migrants to these centers or migrants’ experiences during their initial arrival
period. In order to address this gap in scholarship, my research has concentrated on a first (or
primary) reception center in Sicily, and focuses on non-governmental organization (NGO)
workers’ perceptions of migrants as well as migrants’ conceptualizations of Europe.
My research addresses this gap. Using ethnographic data, I examine the experiences of
migrants in Siracusa, Italy, on the island of Sicily. In particular, I explore how migrants navigate
the local bureaucracies while attempting to obtain healthcare and other basic services in Siracusa.
This addresses not only “on-the-ground” stories and experiences of migrants, but also examines
the systems created by the Italian state that they must operate within. Peripherally this provides
information about perceptions of life before and after migration, discourse surrounding refugees
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in Europe’s current cultural and political climate, and how race and perception of migrants
affects their access to vital services.
I will derive my theoretical perspective from Paul Farmer’s concept of structural violence
and from Slavoj Žižek’s conceptualization of violence. Structural violence, according to Farmer,
is “violence that is exerted systemically - that is, indirectly - by everyone that belongs to a certain
social order ... [it] is intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression”
(2001:307). This includes consciousness, “historical memory and other forms of
desocialization,” and “the impact of poverty and social marginalization” (2001:307). In other
words, not only a directly experienced violence, but also a violence that is the result of the
structures of society, socioeconomic class, race, sex and power structures in place in a given
society. Farmer developed this perspective through ethnographic data while working as both a
clinic doctor and anthropologist in Haiti, witnessing firsthand the results of poverty, government
systems and the effects of globalization. Furthermore, I consider the apparent paradox emerging
from the fact that the EU grants legal recognition to those fleeing war-related violence, but
simultaneously is unable to effectively address the structural problems inherent in the global
economic system that often underpin the need and desire for people to migrate in the first place.
This policy stalemate reflects the increasingly dominant neoliberal ideologies that challenge
efforts to address structural problems faced by refugees—a situation documented by social
science scholarship in Europe and elsewhere (Fraser 2010; Malkki 1995; Ong 2004; Watters
2007; Zolberg et al. 1992).
Žižek’s conceptualization of violence includes four types of violence. First, subjective
violence; “violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent.” This is direct violence where
there is a clear antagonist and victim such as murder, rape, robbery, war crimes, etc. In contrast
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to subjective violence, there is objective violence; “[that which] sustains the very zero-level
standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent.” He breaks down
objective violence further to symbolic violence, “violence embodied in our language and forms,”
and systemic violence, “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our
economic and political systems” (2008:1). Symbolic violence is the violence that results from a
particular conceptualization of the world inherent in our ways of speaking and thinking. For
example, the above referring of an exploitative economic system as “normal,” or the
consequences of sexist language which reinforces a hierarchical relation of the sexes. Systemic
violence in particular refers to, for example, the exploitation of workers in the periphery that is a
result of demand for products in the West and around the world. We in the West perceive the
reception of these good as “normal” and thus not an interruption of our daily lives or the order of
things. Žižek, a Slovenian leftist philosopher, in particular applies much of this to what he terms
“liberal communists” such as Bill Gates, who donate substantial portions of their income to help
people in developing countries. The irony here, according to Žižek, is that these people are often
suffering as a result of the economic system which has made these “liberal communists” wealthy
in the first place. Žižek applies these concepts in similar ways: critiquing the destructive effects
of the current capitalist economic system by revealing its ideological suggestions and
consequences.
The concept of structural violence is particularly applicable to the asylum-seeking system
in Europe. The politics of asylum seeking and the lack of enforcement of refugee legislation in
the EU are very directly contributing to the suffering of those attempting to seek asylum. Malta’s
arbitrary detention of all those seeking asylum and the poor conditions of the detention centers
contribute to an oppressive structure that denies people their human rights. Asylum-seekers can
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sometimes be excluded from the employment market due to detention or lack of compliance with
EU legislation (particularly in Malta) and thus either cannot provide themselves with a means of
subsistence or must seek out illicit employment to provide for themselves and their families. In
the case of Sicily, this sometimes results in migrants being employed by the mafia (organized
crime families in Italy) (Aden Ahmed v Malta Application No. 55352/12 2013, Morehead 2005,
Suso Musa v Malta Application no. 4337/12 2013). Not only is this concept useful for examining
asylum-seekers once they arrive in Europe, but it also contextualizes the conditions they are
leaving. Providing the context for the situations from which asylum-seekers are fleeing is ethnic
persecution, poor economic conditions, war, all of which are often the results of colonialization.
In the case of Syria this is particularly true, where colonial authorities arranged power structures
that exacerbated sectarian divides, leading to an unstable and oppress government, as detailed by
Fildis (2012). These are often the result of forces far outside the control of the normal individuals
within a particular nation-state.
Žižek’s categorization of violence into four types is useful in understanding the different
experiences of refugees. One could classify the sociopolitical conditions in the migrants’ home
nations as a form of “subjective violence.” That is, there is an antagonism enacted upon the
migrants visible in events such as daily violent conditions in nations such as Syria and Somalia,
who both have ongoing civil wars. Refugee discourse in the media includes what Žižek may
classify as “symbolic violence.” The media often refer to the large number of refugees arriving in
Europe as the refugee “crisis.” This suggests that the arrival of refugees and how European
officials have to deal with them is the real crisis. The refugees were not in “crisis” until they
came to Europe and placed a burden on European systems, who claim to lack the resources to
deal with migrations. “Systemic violence,” being similar to structural violence conceptually, is
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also present once again in the enforcement of legislation and local policy. It is also present in the
very situations the refugees flee from, which, as mentioned, are often the result of colonialism. I
will examine the cause and perpetuations of these forms of violence broadly contextualized
within political economy. As Roseberry (1988:179) suggested, I examine “anthropological
subjects at the intersection of local and global history.” That is, considering the confluences of
history, capitalism, power, and class.
Building on Sherry Ortner’s (2006) analyses of agency, I argue that despite oppressive
power structures, migrants enact agency not only in terms of resistance to global political
structures and neoliberal economic policies, but also in terms of individual projects, wherein an
important motivation for migration is the desire to achieve personal and familial stability. Upon
their arrival in Italy, migrants express their desire to find work and education so they can support
themselves and their families in their home country.
Additionally, a Marxist approach to the issue of migration in the context of neoliberal
political economies and power structures will provide clarity for the macro-level forces that in
part dictate the movement and reception of refugees and irregular migrants in the Global North.
As global economic systems have gradually shifted from Keynesian to neoliberal economic
approaches various public services have been cut or privatized, reducing access to and funding
for services such as public transportation and healthcare (Harvey 2005). Additionally, the
colonial relationship between the Global North and the Global South has contributed heavily
toward the unequal development, economy insecurity and political instability in the South. These
forces contribute in part to the influx of refugees to the Global North (Harvey 2005). Within this
context, Papastergiadis (2010:346) states, “the actual flows [of migration] are controlled by an
interplay between structural needs and institutional regulations for entry and exit.” This shift in
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economic ideology has unique implications for displaced persons and refugees. As power
structures force migrants to relocate, states create a reserve labor pool, which fluctuates at the
behest of the expansions and contractions of the market (Papastergiadis 2010). Their vulnerable
position puts refugees in a position in which capitalists can exploit them. The potentially
deleterious effects of neoliberal ideologies on access to healthcare for refugees are visible in
Horton’s (2004) article on differential healthcare access for refugees and irregular immigrants in
the Southwest United States. Delivery of healthcare is based on perceptions of the presence of
neoliberal values in patients, often based on of their ethnic group.
These theoretical approaches will allow me to address the aforementioned gap in
knowledge and critically examine the policies that are presently guiding the asylum-seeking
process in Italy. By providing an “on-the-ground” view of the experiences of migrants’ local
policy interactions this research will provide an as of yet unexamined perspective. Lawmakers
will be able to see the ways in which local actors enact their legislation as well as the
effectiveness of the system in place. This could contribute to more effective and efficient
legislation that can benefit both the migrants and the state’s processing them. The migrants could
potentially benefit in terms of a system that can adequately address their needs. The legislators
may benefit by knowing the best ways to allocate the state’s budgets and by providing a good
environment for asylum-seekers may gain access to a valuable group of people who are willing
to contribute to the community and state as a whole.
In this thesis, I argue therefore that legal policies in Europe and the manner in which they
are selectively enforced effectively trap migrants with whom I conducted research in Siracusa in
a labyrinthine system, often motivating them to clandestinely flee reception centers. The fact that
legislative policies designed to help migrants are selectively upheld at the local level, resulting in

19

the marginalization of migrants in terms of their access to needed services, further shapes the
entrapment migrants experience. As a result of this state-enforced marginalization, NGOs must
often supply vital services for migrants, in particular healthcare. These on the ground legal
realities influence different and evolving imaginaries (Strauss 2006) of Europe as a haven and
consequently shift migrants’ goals and destinations.

The Term “Migrant”

Before continuing, I must address an issue of terminology. “Refugee” denotes a person in
particular legal status. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, these are individuals who
(UNCHR 2010:14):

owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Local officials in each signatory nation to the convention determine whether individuals meet
these criteria. The status of many migrants with whom I conducted research was undetermined;
the migrants I spoke with did not yet have a verdict on whether they qualify for asylum or other
international protection. Thus, I will use the term “migrant” to refer to those traveling to Europe
for safety or economic opportunity (though almost exclusively the former).
This term “migrant”, however, is also not without issue. Metin Corbatir, president of the
Ankara Research Center on Asylum and Migration, and Barry Malone, an editor for Al-Jazeera
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English, have been critical of the term, arguing that by discussing the thousands of people
arriving in Europe as “migrants,” the media dehumanize these peoples’ suffering and eliminated
it from public discourse (Corbatir 2015; Malone 2015). Although “refugee” is a particular legal
status, it also brings to mind the suffering and violence that those coming to Europe have
endured. “Migrant” lacks this weight or implication and perhaps even suggests a lack of
suffering or coming to Europe for solely economic reasons (i.e. seeking higher wages, work that
is more lucrative, etc.). I will continue forward with this word, aware of the implications, due to
the lack of an appropriate alternative term for those fleeing their homes to seek a new life in
Europe.
In brief, I use the following terms in this thesis in relation to migrants coming to Europe.
1) Migrants: any individual who is travelling for any reason. As mentioned, for this thesis
this includes asylum seekers, refugees, and those who do not qualify for international
protection. I will use this word to refer to persons who have entered Europe fleeing
violence and/or poverty.
2) Irregular migrants: migrants who cross borders without documentation. I choose not to
use the term “illegal migrant” 5 except when making a particular point about a piece of
legislation or in quotes.
3) Asylum-seeker: individuals coming to Europe to seek asylum and gain legal recognition
as a refugee.
4) Refugee: persons who have received asylum in accordance with UNHCR guidelines.

5

For more information on the problematic nature of using the term “illegal migrant” or “illegal immigrant” see
Willen et al. 2011.
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METHODOLOGY

While in Siracusa, I conducted participant observation and research with migrants
alongside the Italian NGOs Emergency and Associazione Ricreative e Culturale Italiana (ARCI),
both of which provide medical and legal services, respectively, free of charge for migrants. The
findings in this thesis are based on six months of ethnographic fieldwork from January to July
2015 in Umberto I, a primary reception center for migrants in Siracusa, Italy, in southeastern
Sicily. Centers such as Umberto I process migrants, while local officials determine their legal
status. Depending on whether the migrant wishes to seek asylum, serve as a witness for the state
against smugglers, or if the individual is ineligible for either option, authorities will transfer him
or her to a particular type of second reception center. Overall during the six months, I collected
data with 73 individuals using unstructured and semi-structured interviews, a survey (see
Appendix: Survey Administered to Migrants), and holding informal conversations. Of this group,
52 were migrants in various states of legal recognition. The remaining 21 were key informants,
including Emergency’s volunteers and employees, among whom I interviewed five cultural
mediators, one administrator, one doctor, and one nurse.
I accompanied Emergency volunteers and medical staff to Umberto I center three to four
days a week where I helped with patient intake, which consisted of an initial triage, and
gathering a short patient history. When needed, I also assisted with English-Italian interpretation
between the migrants and NGO staff and volunteers, and informed migrants of their legal rights,
a necessary service due to the lack of legal personnel in Umberto I.

22

Figure 1 Demographic breakdown of migrants interviewed.

Migrants often approached me while I sat outside Emergency’s mobile clinic located
outside Umberto I (see Site Description below) and asked about their legal status and processing.
After explaining their rights in brief, explaining my role as a researcher, and directing them to
local NGOs, they told me of their experiences fleeing their homes and coming to Italy (for a
breakdown of the legal status of participating migrants, see Figure 1). Many times, while I spoke
a migrant, he or she would introduce me to one or more of his or her friends. Scholars refer to
this method of sampling as snowball or purposive sampling (Bernard 2006; Scheper-Hughes
2004). This method involves talking to one individual and asking them to introduce the
researcher to others who fit the inclusion criteria for the study. These conversations frequently
led to semi-structured interviews. The majority of migrants coming to Siracusa have strong
English language skills; consequently, we always communicated in English. Other migrants who
did not speak English spoke either French or Arabic, languages that I do not speak well enough
to conduct research in. Thus, this study does not include non-English speaking migrants. I chose
not to use an interpreter because any inadequacy in translation or understanding on my part or
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the part of an interpreter would run the risk of exposure of the researcher’s biases, compromising
the proper representation of participants (Clifford 1986). Further, errors in translation may have
compromised the validity of data I collected. Trusts also plays an essential role when
communicating with migrants, who have often endured torture, violence, may have participated
in illegal activities, and are distrustful of the state. Not using an interpreter allows the
conversations I had to be of a more intimate nature where migrants could feel more comfortable
explaining their experiences, fears, and desires. Migrants seemed eager to speak with someone
who might know about the reception apparatus for migrants in Italy, and seemed to be happy to
have someone to talk to as they attempted to psychologically recover from their traumas and plan
their futures. A few of the migrants I interviewed have become friends who I keep in touch with
on Facebook. We regularly share recent life events and they still confide in me their fears and
doubts about their legal status and career prospects in their new homes.
My inclusion and exclusion criteria for migrants primarily relate to the populations I had
access to. Consequently, the vast majority of my participants were men (with two exceptions)
and all were over the age of 18. Women do not make up a large portion of my research group
because Umberto I houses only single men or families (the latter were rare) and because I had
difficulty accessing this population because many of the incoming migrants are Muslim. I did not
discriminate for geographic origin or based on length of time in Siracusa, since most of my work
was at Umberto I, the majority of interlocutors were recent arrivals. I spent two to three
afternoons a week in ARCI’s Siracusa office helping with client intake and listening to legal
counselling sessions.
In ARCI, I interviewed six individuals on their legal counsel staff, one state psychologist,
and four state physicians. Additionally, I spoke with two legal professionals who were associated
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with ARCI, but not officially part of the organization. I assigned all interviewees pseudonyms.
The majority of interviews and conversations with NGO workers and other local actors were in
English. A few of these individuals became what Marshall (1996:92) refers to as “key
informants.” That is, people who “as a result of their personal skills, or within their position in
society, are able to provide more information and a deeper insight into what is going on around
them.” These individuals were able to introduce me to people involved in the migrant reception
community, as well as provide insight into the reception apparatus as a whole. Toward the end of
my research period, as my Italian language skills became more robust, I conducted interviews in
Italian, the mother tongue of the majority of my interlocutors. My goal was to interview any
person affiliated with provision of legal or health services to migrants and otherwise there were
no exclusion or inclusion criteria.

Figure 2 Demographic breakdown of local actors interviewed.

I recorded observations on-site in field notebooks. I transcribed these notes into Word
documents on a daily basis. I also maintained a detailed electronic field journal where I recorded
daily observations and reflections on the day’s events. Further, in order to understand the
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complex relationships between policy and reality, I undertook document analysis, reading over
legal documents and court cases in English and Italian.
I did not compensate participants and there was no cost to the participants or direct
benefits from the research, other than legal information for migrants. I recorded interviews on a
digital recorder or written in a notebook and subsequently transcribed them onto a Microsoft
Word document on a password-protected computer. Once I transcribed the interviews and my
notes, I examined them for recurring themes. This notation of recurring themes and concepts is
referred to as coding (DeWalt and DeWalt 2010; Fetterman 2009). I used this to examine the
frequency of particular concepts that emerge during the interview process. Recurring codes in
research help the researcher identify common experiences among interviewees, as well as
contradictions, layers of understanding, and thematic saturation. That is, coding helps a
researcher to understand the nuances of daily life and interactions among and between his or her
collaborators. Strauss and Corbin (1990:148) define saturation as when “…a researcher has
explored each category/theme in some depth, identifying its various properties and dimensions
under different circumstances.” This means not only finding themes during the coding and
research process, but also testing the researcher’s observations to assure validity and depth of
understanding.
Given the complexity of the research question, qualitative data are the most appropriate
means of scientifically examining migrants’ experiences and migrant healthcare provision in
Siracusa (Dewalt and Dewalt 2010). A survey-only based study would allow for easy
comparison between individuals and within data sets but would produce data that may not
accurately reflect the complexity of immigrants’ experiences in accessing healthcare, as
demonstrated in Sarah Horton’s research (2004) where she examined differential access to
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Cuban refugees and Mexican immigrants in Albuquerque, New Mexico, as detailed above. Semistructured interviews allow for nuances necessary for proper understanding of human
experiences (Fetterman 2009). This information can be used to deconstruct concepts of cultures
as “objects” (Clifford 1986), which may lead to stereotyping people of particular cultural groups
instead of attempting to understand them as individuals. However, by examining common
experiences among the individuals I interviewed, I was able to find overarching themes and
trends among migrants’ and local actors’ mutual encounters.

Site Description

The majority of research for this project took place at Umberto I. Umberto I is a primary migrant
reception center in Siracusa, Italy, on the island of Sicily. Siracusa is about 35km south of
Augusta, a major port of arrival in Sicily for migrants once the Italian Coast Guard has rescued
them. Umberto I is located on the outskirts of Siracusa, roughly eight km away from most
services in the city, though still technically within city limits. This center is capable of holding
300-400 migrants, and during my fieldwork had anywhere from a few dozen migrants up to its
maximum capacity. The number of migrants in the center at a given time was dependent upon
the number of arrivals in Augusta, space available in secondary reception centers, and other
state-level factors.
Umberto I is a former middle school with a heavy iron gate, with an open-air concrete
courtyard in the middle of the building. The majority of administrative offices are on the first
floor, with migrant barrack-style rooms on the second and third floors. There is a large room
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below ground used when a particularly large group of migrants comes to Umberto I at once.
There is no air conditioning or heat, as is the case for many buildings in Siracusa. Migrants and
staff can access free Wi-Fi available in Umberto I. Meals were served in a common area.
Emergency’s mobile clinic was located just outside the gates to Umberto I during the
majority of my research. This mobile clinic was a retrofitted RV with two clinics, a waiting
space, a patient intake room, and a bathroom. Patients usually waited outside of the RV. Nurses
wanted to make sure there was room to maneuver if they had to quickly rush across the vehicle
to get to a patient. Migrants needing assistance waited outside on foldable chairs. During cold or
windy days, Emergency allowed patients to wait inside the RV or inside a small tent that workers
erected outside the clinic. Around May, Emergency moved its operations into a small office
inside the reception center. I normally sat outside these areas where migrants waited to see the
doctor. I was not able to sit directly in on any patient consultations due to privacy concerns on
the part of the NGO.
Notably, the necessary local administrators never approved my access to the interior of
Umberto I. In order to access Umberto I, one has to seek out approval from the Prefettura and
other local offices that often function slowly. I intended to seek this access formally, but after a
month or so of working with Emergency, the NGO’s workers invited me to come inside with
them when a new group of migrants arrived. Workers with Emergency gave me a volunteer
badge and was never approached or questioned by the police in the reception center. From that
point on, I became gradually more comfortable going into Umberto I and would regularly make
use of the vending machine inside to get coffee or a small snack. When Emergency transferred
their operations to the small office inside Umberto I, I was also never approached by the police
for this reason (once or twice, a police officer approached me asking where the doctor was).
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Since the appropriate parties did not sanction my presence in the camp, I did not seek
conversation with the police or camp administrators to avoid drawing attention to myself that
would possibly result in expulsion from Umberto I.
I conducted the rest of my research activities in one of two legal offices in Siracusa.
ARCI’s office is located roughly five miles from Umberto I, near the city proper. The office is
open for legal consultations on Monday and Wednesday afternoons. Migrants came into the
office to speak with one of the legal specialists working with ARCI to receive free consultations.
The majority of these migrants were staying in Umberto I, having heard about services while
waiting there. Others, however, were migrants who lived in the Siracusa area. The other legal
office was one owned by a lawyer, Cristiana, affiliated with ARCI and located near the historic
area of Siracusa, roughly a mile from ARCI’s office. The staff there consisted of Cristiana, her
apprentice, and another legal specialist who filed immigration and family reunification
paperwork for migrants. These services, unlike those offered at ARCI, were not free.

Reflexivity

My positionality as a white, college-educated, American male was a constant part of my
research. Local actors in Sicily thought of me as coming from a very wealthy country and
consequently assumed I was wealthy myself. Although in the United States, as a graduate
student, my circumstances are modest, in comparison to many of the people I met in Sicily, who
come from an area of less economic opportunity, I was constantly told I had more opportunities
in my country of origin. Many Sicilians I met were college-educated, but even then, most people
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did not move out of their parents’ house until marriage as a result of economic hardship and
cultural norms. Furthermore, I was told repeatedly that economic and social mobility in Italy
(and especially in Sicily) was heavily restricted by “who one knows.” The people I interacted
with had difficulty finding paying jobs (several people working for ARCI, including lawyers,
were volunteers) or being able to pay their bills and provide for their families. This disparity did
not prevent me from establishing meaningful relationships with many of my collaborators, but it
was ever-present. Even after I had known people for several weeks or months, still occasionally
someone would make a joke or comment about me being American and the socioeconomic
implications that being American carried. However, the longer I was in Siracusa, the less people
seemed to consider me an outsider and thus brought up our differential positions progressively
less.
I also was never fully divorced from the foreign policies of the United States. I was asked
several times about why the US was not intervening more in Libya or other areas marred by
conflicts that impacted incoming migrants. Being an American also made me more selfconscious of people perceiving me in a colonial fashion. That is, seeing me as an outsider who
felt he could come in and fix all the problems with immigration in Italy. This was of course not
the case, although I found myself being asked multiple times “there is a migration crisis in
America too, why don’t you do research there?” On two occasions, this sentiment escalated and I
found myself engaged in heated discussions with a state physician and a local lawyer regarding
my role as a researcher and having to justify my presence and goals. These conversations
eventually came to a point of reconciliation with no negative feelings on either end, though they
served as a lesson to be mindful of my behavior and how others may perceive me. However, the
vast majority of people were incredibly receptive and helpful. Thankfully, any glaring
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differences in my body language, speaking habits, etc. eventually softened as the people I
worked alongside accepted me more. Roughly two to three months into my fieldwork, I was told
“quando sei arrivato qui, eri americano. Ma adesso sei italiano!” (“When you came here, you
were American. But now, you are Italian!”) Also, toward the end of my fieldwork in June, when
I began discussing in depth when I would return to the US, I was told by a NGO worker that I
was now “one of them.” NGO workers also were eager to help me make connections in the area
or to introduce me to migrants who they thought may be interested in speaking with me. Further,
local workers with Emergency were kind enough to allow me to carpool with them to Umberto I
so that I did not have to take public transportation or walk there. Workers at ARCI also invited
me to local events, such as a theater piece that Amnesty International hosted, a local opera that
was using metaphor to comment on the influx of migrants to Europe, and to get drinks with them
from time to time to socialize in a more relaxed environment. I am still in touch with several of
the NGO workers I met during my research and it is likely I will continue to see them during my
return visits to Siracusa.
My positionality was even more obvious inside Umberto I, where migrants were entirely
non-white. The only white people inside the camp were police, administrative personnel, and
those working for Emergency NGO. Consequently, I felt I had to attempt to distance myself
from state personnel and clearly explain I was not in any position of authority in Italy. Often this
was met with frustration or disappointment; migrants wanted help getting documentation and out
of Umberto I. Many people I spoke with also assumed that I might be able to help them get to the
US and obtain citizenship there. I frequently felt guilty or frustrated that I was unable to do more
than provide migrants with legal information or other more immediate forms of help, or do more
than simply give someone an espresso from the vending machine in Umberto I. More than
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anything, I was constantly aware of how far the money I was spending on things like rent,
textbooks, tuition, and my plane tickets to and from Italy could go for the people in Umberto I
who came to Italy with nothing. Sometimes, however, being an American provided some
benefits when speaking with migrants. Many people coming into Italy, particularly those from
West Africa, had regular exposure to American music and movies and associated me, for better
or worse, with these forms of media. Migrants sometimes positively spoke of the large personas
of famous rappers and musicians who embody and promote what are essentially neoliberal ideals
(such as individualism and ceaselessly acquiring money). This sometimes made me somewhat a
novelty and at the least provided an easy way to start a conversation and find common ground.
However, I was always hesitant to positively describe these forms of media that had found their
way overseas. This is in part because I genuinely do not enjoy much of the music migrants
wanted to discuss with me, but also because I felt hyperaware of the fact that the resources that
made these forms of entertainment possible were obtained at the expense of the people of the
Global South.
However, the most obvious moments that revealed my place in racial and national
hierarchies in Italy was when I was in at the questura (police station) submitting paperwork for
my permesso di soggiorno (residence permit). Whenever I had appointments, I and the other
migrants applying for residence permits had to wait outside (regardless of the weather). When
the police spoke to a group of us, they eventually asked me why I was there, seeming genuinely
puzzled at my presence. Saying that the police were more respectful to me than they were to
migrants is an understatement. The police often shouted over migrants, slammed doors in their
faces, or entirely ignored them when they spoke. However, when I spoke, generally the police
listened very attentively. Once inside the questura, my citizenship seemed to grant me
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preferential treatment. Whenever police saw my US passport, they spoke to me more calmly and
amicably than they did to migrants. My race and nationality seemed to grant me a degree
authority that allowed my application process to perhaps be smoother than it is for asylumseekers. In fact, had my research period been three months or shorter, I would not have needed to
speak with anyone at all. US citizens are allowed in the Schengen Area up to 90 days out of
every 180 days without a visa (luckily, I secured a six-month visa to conduct research in Italy
before leaving the US). Thus, solely by virtue of nationality, I would not have had to do much to
justify my presence at all in Italy for up to 90 days.
Finally, I chose to study this topic due in part to an emotional connection to the topic. My
father’s parents both came to the United States as refugees in the 1950’s. Both my grandparents
were ethnically German, but lived in Eastern Europe; my grandfather lived in Romania and my
grandma lived in former Yugoslavia, modern-day Serbia. My grandfather, a US citizen by birth,
was the son of a man who had illegally entered the US through Canada. When authorities
discovered my great-grandfather’s legal status, they deported him to Romania shortly before
World War II began and took my grandfather with him. During the war, invading communist
forced placed my grandmother and her family in concentration camps. Being ethnically German,
they were assumed to be Nazi or fascist sympathizers. During this time, my grandmother
witnessed the execution of several of her cousins and friends. Toward the end of the war, she
relocated to a camp in Hungary. My grandmother, her cousin, my great-grandmother, and her
sister escaped and fled west to Austria, where my grandmother, great-grandmother, and greatgrandfather (who had met them along the way) were able to get passage to the United States as
refugees. The local Romanian government moved my grandfather and his father to labor camps
in Russia. I do not know what happened to my great-grandfather, but my grandfather became
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very ill after forced labor in a coalmine and traveled to West Germany for medical care after the
war ended. There, authorities discovered his US citizenship and he gained passage back to the
US.
Growing up, my grandmother and great-grandmother regularly talked about their
journeys across Europe and finally to the US. Being the grandson of refugees and immigrants
was a prominent part of my identity growing up. I heard about the influx of migrants to Europe
while I was backpacking through Italy in 2012. After speaking to local Italians about the issue, I
independently researched the topic and became interested, feeling a certain level of connection to
people who I imagined to be much like my grandparents. I obtained my Bachelor’s Degree from
the University of Central Florida in December 2012 and worked until starting my Master’s
Degree at UCF. I had read online about the increasing number of migrants coming into Europe
fleeing war, persecution, and violence, and decided to research this topic, inspired also by the
work of anthropologists such as Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Paul Farmer, who aim to use
anthropological data to reduce or ameliorate structural violence and human suffering.
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CHAPTER ONE: ASYLUM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FROM THE UN TO
UMBERTO I

In order to properly understand migrants’ situations, I must contextualize the goings-on of
Siracusa’s migrant reception centers within the appropriate legislature. Laws, regulations, and
guidelines in place provide a baseline for all action and lack of action on the part of local
officials. Further, issues with some of these laws (such as gaps in policy) provide a means for
scholars to critically analyze state and international goals and for activists to potentially suggest
improvements to the legal apparatus. I will now explore the multi-layered framework of national
and international policies that are relevant to the migration process in Italy.

UN-Level Policies

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), all people have the right to
asylum in other countries so that they may be free of persecution (United Nations 1948:4). The
stipulation, however, is that this right “may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations” (United Nations 1948:4). The document does not specify further by what
constitutes conditions “genuinely arising from non-political crimes,” nor does it explicitly state
what is meant by “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”
Consequently, the document leaves the reader to infer that invocation of the right to asylum must
not infringe upon any other right listed in the UDHR. In order to further analyze this legal

35

mandate, I will first address in brief the historic circumstances that led to the creation of asylum
and refugee legislation, as well as the actual enforcement that UN holds for its members.
Refugees emerged as a legal category legal shortly after World War II, resulting from
mass migrations of people across the European continent and to the United States as a
consequence of religious persecution and war. In 1949, the UN created UNHCR and tasked them
with management of the “refugee problem” (Black 2001, Zolberg et al 1989). Soon after, the
1951 Refugee Convention created clear definitions to properly judge who is and who is not a
refugee. The UN initially mandated that this category of “refugee” be comprised of people who
had fled their homelands from political violence (Black 2001). In parlance of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, refugees are individuals who (UNHCR 2010:14):
“owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”
For example, this includes persons who may face violence or persecution as a result of
working in the sex trade in a community that views this kind of work as morally questionable
and as a result begins to threaten the sex worker. Another example that I commonly encountered
in my fieldwork is if a person is a member of, or has family who is a member of a political party
the current government is persecuting. Once these persons leave their home country for fear of
death, torture, or imprisonment, they technically qualify for asylum, though the decision
ultimately is up to the nation state the individual seeks asylum in. UNHCR expanded this initial
definition in 1969 and 1984 by the Organization of African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration
to account for external acts of violence upon nation-states, such as those by an occupying force,
generalized internal violence, or “massive violations of human rights,” (UNHCR 2001:9). In
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situations where the numbers of asylum-seekers coming into a country makes a case-by-case
examination a logistical impossibility, UNHCR encourages nations to make determinations of
eligibility based on their country of origin. For example, if a particular country has an ongoing
and intense conflict, individuals fleeing from this country may automatically be granted asylum
without a legal hearing. This document has 141 nation-states as signatories. A major point of the
document is the concept of non-refoulement. Refoulement is the process of sending a refugee or
asylum-seeker back to their nation of origin or back to a place where the individual’s life or
freedom is at risk (UNHCR 2001:14). Sending an individual back into such circumstances is
expressly forbidden by this document. A hypothetical example of this situation is if a Syrian
person came to Europe to seek asylum and authorities deported him or her back to Syria, despite
ongoing violence and conflict there. UNHCR expressly forbids such actions.
UNHCR maintains stockpiles of supplies around the world in the event of a sudden
migration crisis, though such supplies are limited. The protection of refugees is, according to the
UNHCR, the responsibility of states signatory to the refugee convention (UNHCR 2001:5).
Consequently, the document serves primarily as guidelines and encourages nation-states to
structure its asylum laws in accordance with UNHCR. UNHCR suggests that each refugee
should have the same rights as citizens of a particular country; in particular, UNHCR specifies
rights to healthcare, safety, schooling, and the labor market. Additionally, asylum-seekers must
have access to legal advice and representation, contact with UNHCR, and a personal interview
for requesting asylum. Further, UNHCR discourages detention (“confinement within a narrowly
bounded or restricted location” (UNHCR 2001:81)) of refugees and asylum-seekers. If
administration allows an asylum-seeker to freely come and go from reception centers at set
hours, this does not constitute detention. In the case of Umberto I, administration allows
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migrants to freely come and go as long as they return by roughly six in the evening. Although
this restricts how far migrants can go and how long they can be gone for, UNHCR does not
consider this detention.
According to UNHCR, there are a number of exceptions regarding who is a refugee, such
as soldiers, criminals, and war criminals. The most notable group of people who UNHCR does
not legally considered refugees is economic migrants. The state assessing the asylum request
judges these people as not necessarily fleeing any kind of violence but instead migrating solely
for increased economic opportunities (Zolberg et al 1989). This categorization presents the risk
of states refusing to grant asylum because of their perception of an absence of political violence
in the homeland of the refugee (Zolberg et al 1989). If there is any sort of violence or persecution
in a country that has not reached international awareness, authorities may declare that the
asylum-seeker comes from a “safe” country and thus is coming primarily for economic reasons.
This categorization also ignores the inherent structural violence in poverty, often a result
of neoliberal economic policies and colonialism. I discuss scholarly critiques of this legislative
blind spot later in this thesis. Of great note is that within the Refugee Convention there are no
explicit enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, this document serves primarily as a set of
guidelines without having much real power. That is, UNHCR cannot formally fine nation-states
or do much more than release a public censure and strongly suggest that a government change its
practices to be in accordance with UNHCR policy.
Importantly, UNHCR receives the majority of its funds from only 14 countries, 6 in
addition to the European Commission. As a result, budgetary constraints severely limit the

6

These fourteen countries in order of contribution amount are the United States, the UK, Japan, Germany, Sweden,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Finland. UNHCR
“Funding UNHCR” Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
http://www.unhcr.org/5575a78d0.html
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organization’s ability to deal with large-scale crises. As a result of budgetary shortfalls and lack
of enforcement mechanisms, the Refugee Convention is rendered somewhat effete and toothless,
although it serves in many ways as a model for EU and national level policies.

EU-Level Policies

EU-level legislation in many ways attempts to model recommendations set forth by UNHCR.
The primary legal prerogative in the EU is the Dublin Regulation, the Asylum Procedures
Directive, and the Asylum Receptions Directive. The Dublin Regulation is the regulation that
designates the member state in the EU that must process individual asylum claims (European
Union 2012, Lawrence 2013). The EU state where migrants first lodge their asylum request is
the responsible party for all legal proceedings. This means that Italy and Greece as the most
common portals of entry carry a disproportionately large legal burden. Upon arrival, Italian
authorities require migrants to submit their fingerprints to be entered into and crosschecked in
Eurodac, a database designed to keep track of asylum seekers in Europe. However, many
migrants do not wish to stay in Italy (a topic I discuss later). The Asylum Procedures and
Reception Directives ensure access to a fair asylum application process, legal information,
mental health counseling and healthcare. Additionally, refugees must have access to shelter and
administration must inform refugees of their rights in a language that is understandable to them.
(Council Directive 2003/9/EC 2003, Council Directive 2005/85/EC 2005, Lawrence 2013,
UNHCR 2013).
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However, each member state of the EU has the individual responsibility of enforcing
these laws, as the EU has no means to enforce them. As a result, some member states have
disregarded many of these laws. In the case of Malta, authorities regularly detain refugees upon
arrival. Malta has also made no efforts to reduce overcrowding present in their detention centers.
In two prominent cases in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the court found Malta
guilty of violating several EU laws. Conditions in migrant reception centers and the resulting
detention in Malta pushed these two migrants to leave the camp. Authorities in mainland Europe
ultimately sent these migrants back to Malta, where Maltese authorities jailed them for fleeing
the detention center and were poised to deport these individuals back to their home countries.
The ECHR ultimately required Malta to award these migrants several thousand Euro in
compensation, but this did not change the decisions about the migrants’ rejected asylum
applications. The compensation is further inadequate when one considers that Suso Musa lost the
child she was carrying during the detention process, she claimed in large part as a result of stress
and anxiety from the detention process. (Aden Ahmed v Malta Application No. 55352/12 2013,
Spiteri 2013, Suso Musa v Malta Application no. 4337/12 2013, UNHCR 2013). Consequently,
EU laws are often far from comprehensive and do not adequately uphold the rights of migrants
and asylum-seekers, as I will continue to argue in this thesis. Disparities between policy and
practice in migrant reception are endemic and disrupt migrants’ abilities to exercise their rights.
According to EU law, local authorities are obligated to explain benefits and responsibility
of asylum conditions to applicants within 15 days of receiving their application for asylum.
Furthermore, authorities must give migrants formal documentation of their status as an asylumseeker within three days of filing for asylum, and grant them freedom of movement within each
member state. Organizations providing legal counsel, whether the UNHCR or other NGOs, must

40

have access to migration reception centers. The Asylum Procedures Directive only permits
migrants to request asylum in pre-designated locations such as the primary reception centers, and
are entitled to legal counselling. However, this critical service is at their own cost. Moreover,
such legal advisors, if any, must have access to closed facilities, in particular reception centers
where migrants are, but access is not always easy.
Updated versions of the Reception Conditions Direction and the Asylum Procedures
Directive came into effect on July 21, 2015 (European Union 2015). This law attempts to address
some of the problems discussed here, such as increasing migrants’ access to legal services and
communication with their families, better access to psychological services for victims of torture
and vulnerable populations, and mandates that asylum-seekers must have access to the labor
market within nine months of lodging their claim.
EU policies ultimately mean little, as it is local administrators of migrant reception
centers and other local actors who ultimately see to the enforcement of policy. If these
individuals are not doing their part to ensure the protection of migrants’ rights, then these
policies are effectively meaningless. As I will shortly discuss, the case of Umberto I clearly
illustrates that migrant rights are severely lacking, despite well-meaning policy.

Italian Policy

A major stipulation of both EU and UN-level legislation is that the individual nation-state is
ultimately the responsible party for law enforcement. Therefore, we must examine Italian nation
laws related to asylum and immigration. States classify many migrants, due to their means of
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arrival, as “illegal” immigrants. That is, they did not undertake standard immigration procedures
prior to their arrival in Italy. The Bossi-Fini Law is an important law in the Italian immigration
apparatus and concerns any person who has entered Italy illegally (i.e. irregularly). The BossiFini Law (more formally known as Security Set 2009/94) came into force in 2002 with the
support of the far-right Northern League party (Parlamento Italiano 2009; Reuters 2009).
According to this piece of legislation, irregular immigration is a crime, punishable by a fine of up
to 10,000 EUR and aiding and abetting an irregular migrant is punishable by up to three years in
prison. The law also makes acquiring work permits for all immigrants more difficult by requiring
various forms of documentation: a residence permit, a “nulla osta” (clearance or authorization)
permit, and a “lavoro subordinato” (“subordinate labor” in Italian, as opposed to independent
labor) permit, all of which require recurring visits to local government offices, various
government official signatures (approval from the offices of the Minister of the Interior, Minister
of Health, and the Minister of Labor), and cooperation on the part of a potential employer.
Criticisms of this law are wide-ranging, coming from a variety of academic sources, the
press, the Catholic Church, and UNHCR. They include accusations that the law restricts access
to education and does not follow international laws regarding prohibition of detention in that
migrants are often placed in reception centers for periods of time that critics argue are excessive
(Komada 2011, Swiss Refugee Council 2011, Toscana Oggi 2002). I must note that the punitive
aspects of this document that target irregular immigrants do not apply to persons who legally
qualify for any kind of legal protection, such as asylum-seekers (who, although arriving
“irregularly” or “illegally” are technically legal migrants upon requesting asylum).
The Bossi-Fini Law also established the four different types of reception centers in Italy:
CPSAs (Centri di Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza; First Aid and Welcome Centers), CDAs
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(Centri di Accoglienza; Welcome Centers), CARAs (Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti
Asilo; Welcome Centers for Asylum-Seekers), and CIEs (Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione;
Centers for Identification and Expulsion) (Ministero dell’Interno 2015b). The Italian government
designs CPSAs (such as Umberto I, where I conducted my fieldwork) to provide initial medical
care and a space for individuals to request asylum and for officials to determine their legal status.
These are short stay centers and ideally, authorities transfer individuals shortly after arrival.
CDAs and CARAs are reception centers for individuals granted some form of international
protection; CARAs are for asylum-seekers, and CDAs are for individuals who qualify for nonasylum protection (such as witness protection, discussed further below). Finally, CIEs are centers
designed to hold individuals who the state deems to be ineligible for international protection and
awaiting deportation for a maximum period of 18 months.
The Italian constitution entitles all persons on Italian soil, with or without documentation,
to healthcare services, which means that after receiving formal documentation, migrants have
access to the same healthcare as Italian citizens (Decreto Legislativo 1998). Migrants who lack
documents may register at a hospital and sign a declaration saying they lack money to pay for
healthcare services and receive a card called a Straniero Temporaneamente Presenti
(Temporarily Present Foreigner), or STP, which gives them access to services. Thus, healthcare
of migrants on Italian soil initially falls under the state’s responsibility.
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The Process of Migration Reception in Italy

During my research, I learned that upon initial contact with legal authorities, authorities ask
migrants to provide their country of origin, name, and date of birth, as part of the initial reception
process. Officials record this initial information in a place such as Augusta, a port roughly 30km
north of Siracusa. After this, authorities transport migrants to a CPSA, such as Umberto I. At this
point migrants must allow authorities to record biometric identification data in the form of
fingerprints. Local administrators record the fingerprints in Eurodac, a database that was
designed as a part of the Dublin Regulation (see above). While it is theoretically compulsory for
migrants to provide these biometric identification data, I found that some migrants choose not to.
I will discuss this in further detail in Chapter Four.

Figure 3 Flowchart detailing the expected flow of migrants based on reception procedures and
legislation in Italy. Initial legal processing takes place at the initial port of arrival. Here
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authorities initially sort migrants by legal status. Migrants who are not eligible for protection are
deported. Migrants who are eligible are sent to a CPSA where they can request asylum and/or
serve as a witness for the state (witnesses can also apply for asylum). Once authorities process
the appropriate paperwork and there is room available in a CDA or CARA, they transfer
migrants to the relevant center. If a witness has requested asylum, authorities transferred them to
whichever center has a space available first. After these centers, migrants will ideally acquire
private residence. However, as I will discuss, in many cases migrants clandestinely flee this
reception apparatus.
Umberto I, as a CPSA (see Figure 3), is only supposed to hold migrants for a short period
of time, in this case, 72 hours. When migrants arrive in Italy, the local authorities process their
claims while determining their legal status over a longer period of time. However, upon arrival in
Umberto I authorities give migrants a designation as “asylum-seekers,” “witnesses” for the state,
or “to be deported.” Asylum-seekers are granted one, three, or five-year asylum, which is
infinitely renewable, making it the preferable status. The goal is ideally to turn the initial asylum
permit into a work or study permit, which can eventually result in full-citizenship. Once
authorities formally file a migrant’s request for asylum, migrants wait in a CPSA, such as
Umberto I, until a spot becomes available in a special secondary center for asylum-seekers
(CARAs), which are designed to help them find jobs and learn Italian. Witnesses, on the other
hand, are individuals who have agreed to testify against the captain of the boat on which they
crossed the Mediterranean.
Upon landing in Italy, authorities ask them to sign a paper agreeing to be a witness for the
state. However, this paper is usually in Italian and all witnesses I spoke to said they did not
understand what they were agreeing to, but felt compelled to sign. Additionally, there was no
recognizable pattern in terms of whom authorities asked to be a witness and who was not. Five
Gambian men who were to serve as witnesses told me they had never seen the boat captain;
nevertheless, the authorities assumed that all migrants have had some contact with the captain,
despite migrants’ insistence otherwise. Witnesses receive one year of legal protection and their
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permit is only renewable once. Migrants can change these permits to work or study permits.
Authorities then transfer witnesses to a different secondary reception camp (CDAs) that offers
similar services to centers for asylum-seekers. However, witness camps usually only hold a
handful of people, while asylum-seeking camps may hold up to two or three hundred migrants.
Consequently, witnesses wait in Umberto I for a significantly longer period than asylum seekers;
they cannot leave Umberto I until there is space in a center for witnesses. NGO workers told me
that those who authorities do not allow to stay in Italy are sent to centers (CIEs) that are
essentially prison-like. No one I spoke with knew enough about these facilities to adequately
describe conditions or procedures, making such centers important sites for future research.

“Rights” In Umberto I

Within Umberto I itself, camp administration posted a sign (see Figure 4) on two outdoor walls
on opposite sides of the camp that stated migrants’ rights in Italian, English, French, and Arabic
languages. This sign informed that the center offered housing, food, and clothing, as well as
medical, legal, social, and psychological support. Additionally, “guests” (i.e., migrants, in
parlance of the sign) are entitled to “pocket” money, a phone card, and cigarettes. The sign also
listed responsibilities and rules for the center, primarily relating to behavioral conduct such as
the prohibition of physical or verbal violence, drugs, alcohol, pets, and vandalism. Migrants are
allowed to come and go as they please during daylight hours, but must be back in Umberto I by
dinner (usually around 7pm or so). If a migrant is gone overnight three consecutive nights, then
authorities do not allow them back into Umberto I.
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Figure 4 A sign in Umberto I displays migrant rights and responsibilities. Photo credit: Adam
Kersch.

The police and administrators within the camp enforce these rights and responsibilities. I
did not ever witness an infraction of these rules and thus did not see what a possible disciplinary
process would be if migrants broke a rule. In fact, I was unable to pursue interviews concerning
the exact functioning of Umberto I, as NGO workers were not aware and I was not eager to seek
interviews with the police or administrators in the camp for reasons explained in the site
description above. I will explore the scrupulous enforcement of the “rights” allegedly granted to
migrants in the next chapter.
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Realities of Legal Services in Umberto I

I have demonstrated the multiple levels of laws in place designed to protect the rights of migrants
in Umberto I. However, this legislative apparatus emphasizes local action as a more powerful
tool that large-scale monitoring, trying to create migrant reception as a bottom-up process guided
by international law. Again, in the case of EU and UN law, it is ultimately the responsibility of
each nation-state to enforce these laws and guidelines. This being the case, local politicians,
camp administrators, and NGOs have a tremendous amount of power in the enforcement of these
laws. I will now explore the day-to-day realities of migrants in Umberto I and how many of these
policies are selectively enforced.
In my fieldwork, I found that only a few of these services and entitlements were actually
available to migrants. No migrant I spoke to was aware of his or her legal situation while in
Umberto I. Authorities usually told migrants on the day of their transfer that they would be
moved to another camp, but had no prior warning, making it difficult to inform loved ones, make
preparations, or notify the physician that a particular refugee was to be transferred. Additionally,
those migrants I spoke with who had filed a claim for asylum did not receive any formal
documentation or receipts that could show that their claim is in fact pending. The document that
most closely resembled formal legal papers was a camp identification (ID) card that at the start
of my fieldwork only displayed a guest number, but three months later the camp authorities
began to include their date of birth, country of origin, and name. It was unclear why more
personal information was added to the ID cards, but in any case, this change did not follow EU
directive conditions as defined by the Asylum Procedures Directive (European Council 2013),
which calls for full identification documents within 15 days. In fact, the majority of the migrants
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who participated in my research in the camp remained without these documents much beyond
this time limit. Selective policy enforcement renders migrant legal statuses increasingly obtuse.
Potential legal counsel for migrants, such as UNHCR or local NGOs, is often absent or denied
access to the camp.
During my research, I only saw UNHCR representatives in the reception center twice, but it
seemed they spoke more to camp administration than they did to the migrants. Administration at
Umberto I did not allow the local NGO offering free legal services to migrants, ARCI, into the
center. One of ARCI’s main legal workers during my research was Chiara. Chiara worked for
free at ARCI. Her lack of income from her work made it difficult to support her young son and
consequently was a serious source of anxiety. She worked occasional jobs interpreting between
doctors and patients for the state at local hospitals, but had to rely upon her parents for support.
Despite these ongoing stresses in her life, Chiara was a compassionate advocate for migrants,
with a fierce passion for helping migrants secures their futures in Europe. Chiara explained to me
that this is because of political conflicts between local politicians and the NGO. She added that
administration previously allowed ARCI access to the center, but they prohibited them access
because the organization reported to the state, media, and NGOs on inadequate conditions in
Umberto I:

When we saw repeated violations of the Italian law about acceptance of the migrants
[…] and [sic] violations of the center that are hosting the migrants, of course we
protested. We protested with the media; we protested officially as an entire
organization, not as a local one. But in Sicily, this is very difficult because in Sicily
people [sic] are used to helping people that are friends of someone, so they don't help
give funds or money to people who were causing the decision of the government or
who are protesting the government. So since we're protesting [sic] we are not
allowed at the landings of the migrants or the first emergency camps […] It's very
difficult for them to accept us because we [provided] legal information […] the
government [sic] should be providing themselves but are not. […] They don't see
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[us] as someone who is helping the migrants, they see us as someone who is going
against the law. Also, the first emergency camps – there are conditions and situations
that are unbelievable and there's no control of the central government about this, but
what are we to do?

Chiara’s narrative not only demonstrates the lack of enforcement on the part of the
government, but also her frustration and feelings of helplessness in relation to government action
which, despite EU legislation, means that local officials are not allowing migrants’ legal
representatives access to Umberto I. The most readily apparent motive is politicians’ desires to
save their own reputations, demonstrating perhaps that, at least in part, this marginalization of
migrants is a side effect of political ambitions and agendas, rather than direct antagonisms
toward this population. Further, this displays the role of neoliberal ideals in Sicilian political
operations. This quote implies that financial incentives have more power than questions of
morality and human rights within the migrant reception apparatus. Chiara also sees ARCI and
the services they attempt to provide as a way to help migrants exercise their rights to legal
counsel and to supply a means of protecting migrants’ rights. This suggests that she views
migrants as either unaware of their rights or as unable to assert them to authority figures in
Umberto I. This role only seems to be possible because of a lack of government oversight or
internal accountability that would prevent such actions. Consequently, this serves as another
example of practice superseding policy in migrant reception in Siracusa.
Cristiana Greco, a lawyer working in affiliation with ARCI, explained that based on her
experience and observation, EU laws did not matter in the camps or in migration procedures in
general. In reality however, the case appeared to be more complicated, as local authorities
selectively enforced laws for reasons that were not entirely transparent. Some NGO advocates
believed that reception center managers and local politicians pocketed the money earmarked for
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migrants. From my observations, it is also possible that Sicily simply lacks the resources to
provide mandated services for the ever-increasing numbers of arriving migrants. In the absence
of a stronger political will to remedy this situation, both of these factors are likely to work
synergistically in perpetuating a situation of resource scarcity for local refugees.
Migrants who sought asylum typically lived in Umberto I for several days to weeks,
depending on the number of individuals arriving, and a number of other factors such as the
availability of spaces in secondary camps. Those who agreed to serve as witnesses for the state
waited significantly longer periods, often exceeding two months. This is in part a result of the
fact that witness camps are smaller, and thus there are fewer spots. However, more often the case
is that a judge must officially close these individuals’ cases as witnesses once the prosecution of
the boat captain is complete. This requires extra processing time and migrants receive no
information regarding the status of their cases while in Umberto I, thereby keeping them in a
state of suspension regarding their legal status and future.
As mentioned above, authorities require migrants to submit their fingerprints upon
arrival. Authorities then input and crosscheck these fingerprints in Eurodac, a database designed
to keep track of asylum seekers in Europe. However, many migrants do not wish to stay in Italy
(a topic I discuss later) and may choose to not supply their fingerprints. One example of such a
legal journey is Abraham, an English-speaking man from Pakistan, who applied for asylum in
Italy in March 2015 after arriving from Libya. Abraham had received no information regarding
his asylum application after arriving Umberto I and five weeks later, clandestinely left the center.
He repeatedly told me that the lack of money in Umberto I and his unknown citizenship situation
was causing him severe anxiety: “In Libya, the problem was violence. Here the problem is
money and papers.” His goal was to reach Spain to join a Pakistani friend living in Barcelona,
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but authorities apprehended him at the French border and sent back to Italy four times before
successfully crossing. Every time he authorities sent him back, the Italian police encouraged him
to try to cross the border again. This is likely because Italian authorities are aware that Italy is
often only a transitory destination for migrants - not only are migrants reluctant to stay there, but
authorities are also likely overwhelmed by the number of migrants and therefore might not mind
if the migrants go elsewhere. Abraham told me via Facebook that he was eventually successful in
reaching Spain where he received asylum and found work. However, once winter approached,
Abraham told me that jobs were scarce in Spain and he planned to leave for Germany to find
work there.
This was initially puzzling to me. Upon reaching Spain and requesting asylum, the
Spanish police should have checked Abraham’s fingerprints and after seeing he had requested
asylum in Italy, sent him back there. I asked Chiara how this could have happened. She simply
told me that sometimes there are mistakes in the Eurodac system and authorities do not catch
people seeking asylum in a second country. Essentially, this means that there is no way to
guarantee that the system will legally lock a migrant into the country where he or she initially
requests asylum as Dublin III dictates. Migrants sometimes do not flee Italy for a country with
better asylum prospects after they learn about Dublin III because they know that, in theory,
authorities will deport them back to Italy. The haphazard enforcement of this law essentially
eliminates this concern and protects Italy’s richer northern neighbors from more migrants
coming to seek protection. This unpredictable reality also means that migrants have the
possibility of safely seeking asylum in countries where their economic opportunities will not be
as severely limited as they are in Italy.
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Further, the haphazard enforcement of biometric identification in migrant reception has
interesting implications for issues of governmentality. Governmentality (Foucault 1977), the way
that governments exercise control over their citizens by encouraging citizens to govern
themselves, in this situation is exercised through the knowledge of Eurodac, Dublin III, and
migration laws in general. For example, if a migrant comes to Italy and later decides to flee
clandestinely to Germany and police subsequently catch him or her, they will send the migrant
back to Germany. Migrants’ awareness of this fact may affect their goals and fear of this punitive
measure may deter migrants from leaving Italy (consequently cooperating with EU law).
However, if migrants are aware of the unreliability of Eurodac, their actions may ultimately
change very little. Migrants will not see Eurodac and biometric identification measures as a
deterrent to further migration within Europe. The inconsistency of these measures makes
Eurodac a poor means of governments attempting to exert control. If migrants are aware of
Eurodac’s basic function and rules, but are not aware that implementation is erratic in nature,
migrants are instead resisting the effects of governmentality in Siracusa.
As I have demonstrated, divergences in policy and practice mark the reception of
migrants’ legal experiences in Siracusa. EU law also promises a particular quality of life for
migrants living in Umberto I and centers like it. I will now discuss how these faces of migrant
life in Umberto I are equally uncertain.
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Access to Healthcare and Living Conditions

Living conditions and access to health services are also heavily dependent on the enforcement of
EU legislation. According to the Reception Conditions Directive (2015), EU member states must
guarantee a standard of living that can ensure subsistence of applicants, including vouchers or
financial allowances, as well as provide a means for communicating with their families, NGO
advocates, and UNHCR. Notably, migrants were supposed to receive 75 EUR, disbursed in daily
increments of 2.50 EUR. Had this money actually been given to migrants, there would be reason
to be concerned about how meagre this sum is, however, no one I spoke to ever received this
money. ARCI’s legal staff told me they did not know where exactly the money went. They
believed the state sends money to provinces to distribute it to migrant reception centers, but
somewhere along the way, the money is lost.
In Umberto I, authorities do not give migrants adequate food. People in Umberto I
regularly told me that the meals, consisting of bread and milk for breakfast, then pasta for lunch
and dinner, were inadequate and they went hungry. Notably, this diet is significantly different
from the diet migrants are accustomed in their countries of origin. According to Emergency
medical staff, many people in Umberto I, particularly those from Nigeria, experience
gastrointestinal pain, likely compounded by hunger, as a result of this drastic change in diet.
Given Sicily’s poor economy, it is possible that camp management lacks sufficient funding to
feed the numerous migrants in Umberto I. It is equally possible that, like the monthly allowance,
authorities are not distributing the resources allocated to migrants. However, Administration
does give migrants cigarettes once a week.
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People in Umberto I, in addition to cigarettes, did receive a prepaid 10 EUR SIM card,
but often had no cell phone to put the card in. Those who did have cell phones were very popular
in the camp, as other migrants would regularly ask if they could use the phones to check
Facebook or make phone calls to get in touch with loved ones. Oftentimes, migrants would sell
the SIM cards to people in town or to other migrants with phones for less than the 10 EUR value
of the card to get some form of income while they waited in the camp.
The Reception Conditions Directive (European Union 2013) and Asylum Procedures
Directive (European Union 2005) also dictate that local authorities must give victims of torture
and violence proper medical care that addresses conditions resulting from their trauma. The
state-run healthcare system, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale (ASP), sends a physician to Umberto
I every Wednesday, but does not provide services the other six days of the week. There were no
mental health services available to migrants in Umberto I, even for victims of torture. A state
psychologist working at a secondary reception center for migrants near Siracusa said that
psychological counselling was an incredible rarity in migrant reception centers across Italy.
Consequently, innumerable migrants reeling from their journeys are unable to access services
vital to their long-term mental health and wellbeing.
Updated versions of the Reception Conditions Direction and the Asylum Procedures
Directive came into effect on July 21, 2015 (European Union 2015). This law attempts to address
some of the problems discussed here, such as increasing migrants’ access to legal services and
communication with their families, better access to psychological services for victims of torture
and vulnerable populations, and mandates that asylum-seekers must have access to the labor
market within nine months of lodging their claim. The examples in this research demonstrate,
however, that it is ultimately up to local actors to enforce these laws. Given the manner in which
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authorities enforce previous laws, it remains a question for future research to what extent these
legislative changes will result in changes in practice.
The lack of services for migrants further marginalizes them by limiting their access to
EU-mandated legal and health services. Additionally, laws legally trap migrants in centers like
Umberto I while they await transfer to a secondary center for asylum-seekers or witnesses.
Consequently, local NGOs must increasingly fill in the gaps in state services. In my research, the
two main organizations fulfilling this role were Emergency and ARCI, which provided free
health and legal services, respectively. In the case of Umberto I, NGOs were the only source of
health or legal service (with the exception of the one-day a week state-provided medical
services).
The inconsistencies in policy enforcement have implications not only for migrants, but
also for the nation-states that receive them. Migrants’ experiences and perceptions of opportunity
will change their end goals, often influencing migrants to leave Italy. This not only helps
construct migration as a European-wide issue in that more migrants will be arriving in other
member states, but also has implications for the functionality of the state. Instead of becoming a
monolithic barrier to migrants’ process, legislation becomes a complex series of loopholes that
migrants must navigate in order to secure their futures in Europe. In some ways, this is
advantageous to migrants in that there are possibilities for migrants to express further their
agency instead of lack of information entirely trapping migrants within the legislative apparatus.
The differences in policy and practice also exemplify the complexity that marks asylum
and migration law. Different goals of the UN, EU, Italian government, Sicilian provincial
government, and the administrators of Umberto I intersect in these places of actions where the
desires of one of these groups nullifies those of another. Consequently, this underlines the

56

importance of collaborative action between these individuals in order to reach common goals.
However, given some of these goals, such as further restricting migrants’ movement, are
disadvantageous to people clandestinely arriving in Europe, this disjuncture provides navigable
spaces. NGOs add another layer to these converging goals. NGOs attempt to fill these gaps in
services in their goals to protect migrants’ internationally guaranteed (but still absent) rights.
Their services, by making migrants more legally aware of their rights and potential futures, in
some ways work against local administrators and state goals, much as Chiara said. These spaces
of conflict present an interesting area of activity for NGOs, migrants, and the state.
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CHAPTER TWO: MIGRANT RIGHTS AND THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS

There is a stark disparity between policy and practice in Umberto I, as I have demonstrated in
Chapter 1. Civil society in Siracusa and Italy as a whole is aware of many of these disparities and
gaps in services to migrants. Consequently, NGOs provide a very important role in the provision
of essential services to migrants. I will now explore the role of the two NGOs in Siracusa and
how they provide legal and medical services to migrants.

The Role of ARCI

Migrants I spoke to in Umberto I commonly felt trapped. Lack of awareness of how the Italian
legal system functioned exacerbated such feelings. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, various laws
entitle migrants to legal consultations in camps, but NGOs were largely absent in Umberto I
because of conflicts between these organizations and local officials. Consequently, migrants
were in desperate need of legal counseling and other services that ARCI provides. Most arrived
in Italy holding rather optimistic views of what awaits them in Europe, but this optimism quickly
faded to anxiety and feelings of rejection as they were forced to wait in Umberto I. Typically,
migrants explained to me that they were given no information by camp administration
concerning how long they may need to wait before being transferred. Rumors about when such
transfers from Umberto I might take place occasionally floated through the center among
migrants. These rumors sometimes led to speculation about who might be leaving next; migrants
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based guesses on how long a person had been in Umberto I, but given migrants’ lack of
knowledge of the migrant reception system, transfers often appeared random to them. With every
new group brought into the center, a few new migrants usually left clandestinely to go to
Germany, the UK, or Sweden only a day or two after arriving. The majority of others insisted
they intended to follow the camp rules and wait for formal recognition of their legal status. After
several days or weeks without information, however, people begin to disappear slowly from the
center. Several times, I arrived in Umberto I and asked about a particular person I had spoken
with, only for one of the other migrants to tell me that he had left clandestinely, heading for
Germany.

Figure 5 A sign hanging in ARCI's office aimed at spreading awareness of migrant struggles
reads "drowned lives" in Italian. Photo credit: Adam Kersch

If migrants attempted to speak to camp management to inquire about the progress on their
legal paperwork often they were instructed “aspetta, domani” (“wait, tomorrow”). In fact,
oftentimes these were the first two Italian words migrants learned. It is also of note that aspetta is
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the informal form of the verb “wait,” suggesting unearned familiarity, and thus likely disrespect,
on the part of the camp staff. When possible, I directed research participants to ARCI, explaining
that the NGO offered free legal services. Usually within a week or so, migrants came to ARCI’s
office on a Monday or Wednesday afternoon (the only times the office was open for these
services) and I helped with client intake and listened in on legal counselling sessions. ARCI’s
office, marked inside and out with posters such as the one in Figure 5, was located in a part of
Siracusa that was about a five miles walk from Umberto I. Consequently, getting to and from
ARCI’s office took several hours. This time, plus the time waiting in the office and during
consultations, meant that migrants barely had enough time to leave Umberto I in the morning and
get back before curfew. The staff at the office usually consisted of a lawyer, a legal staff
member, and maybe one or two volunteers. ARCI’s main goal is to provide free legal counseling
services for migrants, regardless of their legal designation. While I was in Siracusa, I saw ARCI
assist asylum-seekers before and after their asylum request hearings, witnesses, and migrants
with Italian citizenship. However, because of the above-mentioned dearth of services to newly
arrived migrants, this group was ARCI’s main population of interest.
ARCI (Associazione Ricreazione e Culturale Italiana; Italian Association for Recreation
and Culture, in English) is a national Italian organization. ARCI was formed in 1957 the wake of
the collapse of fascism in Italy and aimed to provide programs promoting social unity during this
period of intense change. The organization as a whole does not dedicate itself to assisting
migrants. Instead, each local branch of ARCI tackles a different issue particular to the area. In
some cases, ARCI has lawyers supporting LGBT rights, and in others ARCI branches work
toward providing recreational activities or cultural education (“cultural” is not specifically tied to
Italian culture but instead relates to cultural education in a broader sense) (ARCI). Being that
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Siracusa is a major point of arrival for migrants in Italy, the Siracusa branch of ARCI focuses on
this problem.
For those seeking asylum, ARCI could do very little. For those who were in the “witness”
category, ARCI’s main lawyer was Sofia, a warm and energetic woman with slightly greying
hair in her late 40s. She worked free, but had other jobs to support herself. Sofia regularly
attempted to contact the judge presiding over the migrant’s case. Most of the time, this might
expedite the legal process slightly, but sometimes ARCI’s attempts were in vain and the judge
unsympathetic, thereby leaving migrants legally trapped in Umberto I until the process moved
forward. Migrants who lived in Siracusa in a CARA or CDA, and thus did not anticipate moving
to a new city, came to ARCI to help prepare for their asylum hearing. Advocates at ARCI
typically explained the kinds of questions the local commission might ask and how migrants
should respond. When migrants were close to their hearing dates, workers at ARCI conducted
mock hearings to help migrants prepare. As a result, ARCI was an important organization to
many of the migrants. Without its support, migrants would be unable to afford legal counsel and
would be largely unaware of the asylum request process, or how to contest decisions about their
asylum stats. Since the state did not supply any of these services, those affiliated with ARCI
often became many migrants’ friends and confidants as the migrants attempted to navigate their
new lives.
Migrants often felt trapped in Umberto I and would confide in workers at ARCI that they
wanted to leave Italy to find a better future. Advocates working for ARCI explained to migrants
that if they left Umberto I to go to another country, they would most likely be caught by the
police and sent back to Italy and be back in the same situation they had been in before leaving.
This reality ultimately did not deter people, and in fact, stories of successful escapes circulated
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around the center and encouraged many to leave. The frustration from existing in legal liminality
often leads migrants to turn against the system. As time passes and as authorities keep migrants
in the same situation seemingly indefinitely, migrants resist this entrapment and effectively
“disappear” from the legal system by leaving clandestinely. This was especially the case for
migrants who authorities designated as witnesses for the state, who often faced longer wait times
in Umberto I. This group of people became increasingly agitated and distraught over time as
authorities transferred other residents in the camp.
Almost all legal witnesses I spoke to in Umberto I related a similar concern that when
they were initially processed at ports such as Augusta, authorities asked them to sign papers that
they did not understand. These papers allegedly served to confirm that the migrants would testify
in court against the people smugglers who had brought them across the Mediterranean. Each of
the witnesses expressed frustration at this event, asserting that had they known what this legal
process entails, they never would have signed the papers. One migrant in this situation, Minteh,
had experiences emblematic of those faced by other witnesses. “It’s too much,” Minteh told me
“we came to Europe for our liberty, but here we have no liberty; it’s like we are in prison.” When
describing how he was coerced into signing papers, he said he felt that local authorities were
“using [him] for their own gain.” He and his friends felt betrayed by the state in that they were
agreeing to help the government as legal witnesses, but the government was doing little in return.
Minteh disclosed that after this, he felt he would be better off leaving Italy and traveling to
Germany. Minteh and his friends came to speak with advocates at ARCI on a regular basis and
often these advocates had no updates for the men; the judge was still sitting on the case. In these
circumstances, when Minteh and his companions became visibly frustrated, exasperated, or
anxious, those at ARCI tried to console them and explain that they simply needed to wait and the
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paperwork would come. These attempts only went so far; over time, they became increasingly
hopeless. A few weeks after initially seeking consultations at ARCI, Minteh and the five men he
had arrived with were no longer in the camp. Though the services that ARCI provides fill a very
important role, in several instances they were not enough to counteract the anxiety and dejection
provoked by environment migrants find themselves in.
The workers themselves constantly expressed frustration at the government’s handling of
migrants, saying that authorities handled cases in an excessively slow manner, that they did not
consult local experts or NGOs on how to respond effectively to migrants’ needs, and most
commonly that the government was simply corrupt. Chiara’s lamenting toward the end of
Chapter 1 that the government did not want ARCI around or did not listen to them was typical
among workers with the NGO. They felt that, due to the rampant corruption, any effort on their
part to lobby the government or attempt to enact any kind of change was likely to fail.
Consequently, those at ARCI said they did the best that they could, though as demonstrated in
some cases this amounted to frustratingly little.
Another crucial role that ARCI plays in Siracusa is general advocacy. ARCI organized
several different public events during my fieldwork, including a candlelight vigil for drowned
migrants in the main town square, a large concert on May Day, and a few other events with the
aim of spreading awareness about issues migrants face and allowing locals a chance to speak
with migrants. Workers at ARCI felt that interacting with migrants were crucial for garnering
sympathy from the local community. Workers argued that if locals were able to see that migrants
were ordinary people who had endured extraordinarily harsh conditions, they would be helpful
and compassionate toward migrants. Additionally, ARCI interacted with Amnesty International
to help the organization coordinate a theatrical event using live actors that attempted to depict the
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hardships migrants face during and after their journeys (ARCI workers later told me they
disliked the event, calling it “cheesy” and offensive for having the Italian actresses dress as
Arabs). Turnout at these events was variable, ranging from around ten or so people to a few
hundred.
Although Amnesty International designed this event to spread awareness, it ultimately
was severely melodramatic. The event was on a weekday night in one of Siracusa’s town
squares. The actresses, wearing sheer and borderline transparent garments meant to pass as
hijabs, recited stories of migrants crossing the Sahara and Mediterranean. Each of the actresses
recited a monologue, while the other crept through the crowd whispering repeated lines from the
other actress, like an eerie echo. Between these monologues, a third woman came on stage who
performed a kind of pseudo-Arab interpretive dance, seemingly aiming to replicate the hardships
migrants faced coming to Europe. A few migrants in the audience who had endured these events
left before the show was over.
Chiara later explained to me that her clients told her they left the show out of a
combination of frustration at the bad acting and flashbacks they experienced from their own
journeys. A few local Sicilians in attendance seemed enraptured, while one or two of ARCI’s
workers laughed at the bizarre dances. I sat in the audience, perplexed and agitated at this
flagrant expression of Orientalist ideologies. There were undoubtedly thousands, if not tens of
thousands of women who were actually Arab or West African migrants that Amnesty
International’s Italian branch could have asked to partake in the event, to provide authentic
stories of survival. Instead, European actresses attempted to function as a voice for these
marginalized persons. Advocates at ARCI, such as Sofia and Chiara, ultimately seemed content
with the attempt to spread awareness, but dismissed it as “silly.”
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ARCI also functions as a mail location for migrants. Migrants need physical addresses so
that the government may regularly send them their immigration and labor paperwork. Migrants
are sometimes unable to provide such an address because of their specific living conditions.
When this is the case, migrants can provide ARCI’s mailing address as their own (there is not an
Italian equivalent of US Post Office boxes). It was normal to see someone come in just to pick
up their mail during ARCI’s hours of operations. If migrants had questions about a particular
piece of paperwork they received, then they would wait there until they could speak to one of the
workers at ARCI.
The NGO is also involved with other local organizations working with migrants.
Emergency and ARCI’s Siracusa branches communicate regularly to discuss the best ways to
deliver their services. ARCI has a sister organization that works exclusively with underage
unaccompanied migrants in Siracusa called Accoglierete (“we will welcome you all” in Italian).
The two organizations used to share offices and several members of ARCI’s staff work for both
organizations.
During an interview with Chiara, I asked her how the general community’s perception of
migrants had changed over time. She recounted that ten years ago, people in the area were
generally xenophobic and racist. Sicilians saw migrants as dangerous intruders who might bring
crime and chaos that they associated with West Africa and the Middle East. Further, they
perceived these migrants as a threat to the already unstable Sicilian economy, as they assumed
migrants would live off welfare services and possibly “steal” the jobs of Sicilians. However, over
time she believes that exposure to migrants has helped people become more accepting of them
and generally sympathetic toward the struggles they face. “I saw big changes between local
people trying at least trying to understand the reason these migrants are coming and why these
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migrants are asking for money or begging outside. They just start to understand that it's not that
they have a choice or to have another possibility to have money or whatever they look for.”
Other workers with ARCI echoed this sentiment. While being critical of the media’s portrayal of
migrants as dangerous, and what they described as the “xenophobic rhetoric” of politicians, they
generally believed that because of the level of exposure to migrants, Sicilians as a whole have
become more accepting of migrants.

The Role of Emergency

In 2013, the Italian government contacted Emergency NGO and requested that they supplement
medical services provided by the state in Umberto I camp. The government was not, however,
offering to fund the organizations’ work in the camp, effectively leaving the NGO to fundraise,
seek grants, or simply volunteer in order to provide the healthcare to migrants that the state
requested. Emergency agreed, based on their own experiences and knowledge of the severe need
for care at the camp, and now provides free medical services four days a week in Umberto I.
The staff at these clinics consists of one doctor, two to three nurses, and an administrative
coordinator. This is a relatively small staff considering the fact that Umberto I can hold up to
roughly 300 migrants, though sometimes only a few dozen are there. Additionally, a vital
component of staff is the presence of advocates known as “cultural mediators.” Local
government administrations certified these people through classes offered around the country.
Cultural mediators, usually paid members of the NGOs or contracted by the state, speak multiple
languages and have specialized training to interpret between languages as well as between
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cultures. This means making experiences, particularly of illnesses, understandable to people who
may have very different ideas of how a person becomes unwell. 7 Typically, the cultural mediator
has knowledge of common religions, cultural practices and customs, and recent histories of
particular geopolitical areas. This approach can create a somewhat essentialized view of
particular people or experiences, as documented by anthropologist Cristiana Giordano (2014) in
her research on refugee women in Northern Italy. Although cultural mediators often have good
intentions, Giordano observed that they often altered migrants’ stories to provide a better fit to
categories of state protection. This meant that cultural mediators exaggerated some details and
left out others, playing into state narratives about the lives of people suffering around the world.
However, medical staff with Emergency constantly lauded the cultural mediators’ work as
essential in their interactions and efforts with refugees. Typically, two to three cultural mediators
work in each clinic by providing interpreting services and conducting initial patient interviews to
determine reasons for migration and medical history. Additionally, when migrants need followup care at a hospital, cultural mediators drive them there to interpret between languages and
cultures. Interestingly, cultural mediators are a commonality in Italy. While I was in Siracusa,
there were two different training sessions available for cultural mediators that I heard of. When I
told local activists cultural mediators did not exist in the US, they found this very surprising and
interesting.
Emergency addresses health issues related to the journey across the Mediterranean, such
as burns, dehydration, join pain, and exposure. Staff emphasized that communicable diseases
such as tuberculosis (TB) are rare among migrants arriving in Sicily. This was an especially
7

“Culture-bound illnesses” (or folk illnesses) have received significant attention in medical anthropology and more
recently in medicine (particularly so in mental health). These are illnesses that are depicted to be a result of a
particular cultural view or ideology that lead to a specific set of symptoms (Isaac 2013). Often these illnesses are
dismissed as less legitimate than conditions with biomedical identifications. Cultural mediators in Italy work to find
a middle ground between these two views so that patients can receive proper treatment.
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important point given the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the home of many migrants
arriving in Siracusa. This is a particularly interesting observation, given the extensive work on
migration facilitating the spread of infectious diseases. Anthropologist Merrill Singer (2009)
demonstrated migration as a factor in the spread of TB, cholera, and malaria in the Global South.
The stress of migration and the lack of familiarity with local norms and protocols in seeking out
medical care often combine with any illnesses migrants have, exacerbating the severity of the
illness and increasing the length of time that an individual is contagious. This contributes to a
scenario wherein migration by itself can be a determinate of health. Emergency medical staff is
on the lookout for such diseases, particularly TB, but they report that they “almost never” see
cases of the illness or others like it in the refugee camp.

Figure 6 A migrant waits for the doctor outside Emergency's mobile clinic. Photo credit: Adam
Kersch.

Upon arrival in Umberto I, migrants receive a visit to their living quarters from
Emergency medical staff, after which staff accompanies individuals in need of medical care to
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the mobile clinic (pictured in Figure 6) just outside the camp (migrants from Umberto I can also
come to the clinic whenever necessary). Emergency staff then triages patients by the urgency of
their condition. At this point, the patient waits anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours to
see the doctor because at a given time, there is only one physician and two nurses working at
Umberto I, a reception center capable of holding several hundred people.
After seeing the doctor, migrants are given a small red book containing a brief summary
of the visit - a form of record in which to document their healthcare over time. Because there is
no open communication between the state and the NGO workers when migrants are transferred,
migrants who choose to clandestinely leave the camp may need this book the next time they see
a physician, and if a follow-up visit is necessary, the patient is then entered into the public
healthcare system, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale (Provincial Health Agency) or ASP, and
receives an STP card. The roughly one-week delay associated with this process further increases
migrants’ wait times before receiving medical care. If an individual is transferring during this
wait, he or she does not receive follow-up service at the next camp and must begin the process
again. However, if authorities do not transfer him or her, Emergency takes the migrant to receive
care in a proper hospital. Thus, the red book, while intended to help track the care received, does
not necessarily ensure prompt administration of services.
Emergency’s medical operations at Umberto I are not restricted only to undocumented
migrants in the reception center. If anyone, regardless of legal status, is in need of medical
services, he or she can seek medical care from Emergency. Police, local construction workers,
and documented migrants from Siracusa made up the patient load from time to time. The most
memorable patient who was not from Umberto I was a Malian man, Mohammed. Mohammad
had asylum in Italy, but he was “between” documents. That is, his previous documents had
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expired and he had not yet received his current documentation. This is due to extraordinary wait
times in government processing, as I discuss briefly below. Because of this, he did not have
documentation that entitled him to healthcare. Mohammad was visibly ill. His gait was labored
and his face pale, while rattling coughs continuously interrupted his sentences. The day before
coming to Emergency’s clinic, he asked a lawyer at ARCI for help: How could he seek medical
care without documents? The lawyer, Cristiana, could tell that he was in very poor health and
suggested he go to Emergency the next day. When he came to the mobile clinic, he could barely
walk up the short stairs into the RV. Given the severity of his condition, he did not have to wait
behind other patients and staff saw him immediately. The staff, obviously concerned, came out
of the examination room a few minutes later. They immediately called an ambulance to take
Mohammed to a proper hospital that would have the necessary facilities to treat him. Dr. Monti,
the physician at Emergency who cared for Mohammed, told me that he was likely having liver
problems.
The extra waiting period during STP processing is vital. No one gives migrants
notification of their legal status while in Umberto I. During this period, many migrants are also
recovering from traumas that may include torture, rape, exposure to the elements, and body
aches from the cramped boats that take migrants across the Mediterranean.
Dr. Monti, a physician working with Emergency, detailed that the NGO sometimes has
trouble in communications with the government, which subsequently affects the patients that he
must treat; he explains as follow:
It's not so easy for example, immediate access of the person to secondary care.
Because sometimes also with STP processing […] there is a time you have to
wait. Sometimes it's not so clear - the pathway - also the hospital sometimes can
be a problem. Sometimes also there is no connection between the camps. I mean
for example, the treatment we start here can be changed or interrupted […]
Between the camps it’s not so easy to get information […] sometimes I don't
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know when and where they are […] if administrators informed me that maybe
tomorrow or in two days some person will be moved so I can write something, I
can report something so that it's easier for the new doctors to know something
about the history of the patient for the treatment of the patient or what we've done
here. It would be great. Sometimes it’s not so easy to do.

Consequently, transferred migrants cannot receive appropriate follow-up care without the red
books that Emergency supplies. The reason for this gap in communication is unclear. Dr. Monti
maintained that Emergency openly shares demographic data from their medical services with the
government. Thus, Dr. Monti blames these shortfalls in service and delays in care on the public
healthcare system and reception center administration. Regardless of fault, because of this
process migrants must continue to wait for care for their maladies. This serves as another
example of the puzzling enforcement of asylum processing legislation. The lack of action on the
part of the state is indicative of a lack of funding to address the issue, an absence of concern for
migrants’ health, or a shortfall in communication between different levels of local actors (those
who see the problems and those with the administrative power to fix them). These three
scenarios all have varying implications, but essentially amount to a lack of accountability or
oversight on the part of Italian administrators and health officials.
However, ASP administrators complained that Emergency could sometimes be difficult
to communicate with. Barbara, one of two ASP administrators with whom I spoke, contended
that they have difficulties with Emergency’s branch in Palermo (a standing clinic that seeks to
address the needs of poorer people in the city and other marginalized populations). She related
that one of her colleagues consistently lamented that they did not get adequate information from
the NGO, but despite these communication difficulties, she stressed that the public health system
“does not work” for migrants and badly needs reform. She argued people must understand
migrant health as a political idea, rather than a just a service provision; that is, migrant health
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must be understood as a human rights issue that requires policy reform and legislative action.
Her counterpart, Antonio, further told me that Emergency, funded solely by private donations,
had major difficulties in that they had no consistent sources of income, and as a result, they gear
their activities toward too much fundraising for their operations instead of focusing on the
operations themselves.
The good news came a day before I left Italy, when the Italian Ministry of the Interior
announced that it would begin to fund Emergency’s operations in Italy. This may alleviate some
of these tensions, though Omar, a cultural mediator from Emergency, worried that it might
corrupt Emergency’s activities. He feared that the organization might become less critical of the
Italian state as a whole now that it is receiving financial support from the government. However,
these funds are likely a result of Emergency’s expanded operations in the area. The majority of
the time I was in Siracusa, Emergency’s operations in Southeast Sicily were in Umberto I and at
a reception center called Papa Francesco (“Pope Francis” in Italian) for unaccompanied minors.
During the last month or two of my fieldwork, Emergency expanded its services to Augusta (a
major port of arrival for migrants), Catania (a major Sicilian city that, according to activists, has
a large population of homeless migrants), and a few other minor reception camps in the area.
Consequently, it is possible that the government felt it should compensate Emergency given this
expansion or that Emergency administrators said they could not expand without financial
assistance. In either case, according to Omar, this new source of funding may compromise what
he views as one of the main reasons for Emergency’s autonomy and integrity.
Notably, Emergency has a reputation as a politically left leaning organization. Omar
disclosed that this could at times lead to the police within the camp being less than cooperative
when Emergency tries to enter the camp during tense moments that may occur in the presence of
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the police (as recounted below). While other NGOs in the area sometimes have “arrangements”
in which they work in conjunction with the local Prefect’s Office, but this is not the case with
Emergency. The NGO is, in fact, often openly critical of human rights violations and
government policies with respect to refugees, which as the example above with ARCI shows, can
cause problems, or at least extra work, for local politicians and police officers. Consequently, he
believed that the police are not always honest with ARCI and sometimes make it difficult for
them to speak with migrants.
Omar recounted a particular event where he believed the police ordered some newly
arrived migrants not to speak with the NGO workers. Upon hearing screaming within the center,
Emergency, suspecting the police were mistreating migrants, went to investigate, but the police
did not allow them in. The police nonchalantly explained that the migrants screamed when police
tried to photograph them (a claim all NGO staff dismissed as absurd). When police were done
with the migrants, Emergency tried to ask them about what happened but all the migrants were
silent and refused to speak. The next day, Emergency went to the camp to which authorities
suddenly and inexplicably transferred the migrants. A few migrants had bruises on their wrists
and said the police physically forced them to provide fingerprints. Shocked upon hearing this, I
asked whether they planned to take any action. Omar replied, frustrated, “the only thing we can
really do is file a report” with the NGO and the government. Such tensions are likely a result of
the differing goals of the actors involved, with NGOs expressing migrant health to be their main
priority in Sicily, and the police, who likely want to process as many migrants as quickly as
possible.
Another part of Emergency’s duties arises if Emergency discovers that there is an
underage (under 18 year-old) person in Umberto I and will notify ARCI or Accoglierete so that
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authorities can transfer the person to the appropriate center. As there are different types of
protection for minors, particularly unaccompanied minors, the reception process for this
population is different than it is for adults. Even if these persons do not qualify for asylum or
qualify to be witnesses, they are eligible for protection in Italy until they turn 18 (Ministero
dell’Interno 2015a). Laws allow minors who come to Italy with their parents to remain with their
parents during the reception process. However, a well-known NGO that also operates in the area,
Save the Children, became frustrated that Accoglierete and ARCI were doing what Save the
Children (who seldom came to Umberto I) felt was their job. The organization essentially asked
Accoglierete and ARCI to stop performing this task, and the administrator of Accoglierete
complied. Emergency still notifies ARCI, Accoglierete, and Save the Children that there is an
underage person. However, workers from Emergency, ARCI, and Accoglierete all told me that
Save the Children was not performing this job. This has led to a few instances where Emergency
discovered an underage migrant and reported to the above organizations, but no one came in time
and administrators transferred the migrant to a secondary reception center.
Emergency thus not only serves as a means of fixing the ailments of migrants, but like
ARCI, a means of protecting the rights of migrants. Dr. Monti told me that when Emergency
originally arrived in Umberto I, NGO workers reported that police beat migrants regularly, that
authorities did not allow migrants outside, and were subject to a variety of other atrocities.
Thankfully, these reports had some effect and the NGO had not seen such treatment at the
reception center since. It is troubling that both ARCI and Emergency report difficulties
communicating with the government, as it seems to suggest either that local government officials
are unwilling to cooperate or that they are not actively concerned about the wellbeing of
migrants. When I asked about what improvements they envisioned for the migrant reception
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system, people working for both organizations stressed that better cooperation between NGOs
and the government was the only way to address adequately migrants’ needs. The above example
about past activities at Umberto I seem to suggest the latter.

A Legal Office in Siracusa

The final non-governmental form of assistance I regularly observed in Siracusa was in a law
office located near the historic center of Siracusa, roughly a 15-minute walk from ARCI and had
a sign outside advertising the services workers provided (see Figure 7). The sign lists renewing
residence permits, requesting information about residence cards, facilitating family
reunifications, document translation, questions about the Italian language test (a necessary
component of receiving citizenship), information regarding work permits for foreigners, and
applying for tourist visas for overseas visits (many of migrants’ countries of origin required such
a permit for visits). This office is not a formal non-governmental organization and is a for-profit
office, but still provided an important means for migrants to seek legal counsel and learn about
their rights and constitute a part of civil society. There were normally two workers at the legal
office, Giulia, a cultural mediator who assisted with immigration and family reunification
paperwork, and Isabella, an apprentice of the main lawyer of the office, Cristiana. Cristiana is
affiliated with ARCI and Accoglierete. The office is open five days a week from approximately
10am to 7pm with a two to three-hour break for lunch around noon. These hours were somewhat
variable, as is the norm for businesses in Siracusa. Giulia was in the office every day and by
appearances most of the time it is her office. Cristiana’s busy schedule with ARCI and
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Accoglierete meant she was only in the office two to three days a week. Her apprentice was there
three to four days a week.
Unlike ARCI and Umberto I, the majority of the clients at the office already had legal
documentation to be in Italy. Most often, those with legal status came to Giulia to file family
reunifications, as permitted by Dublin III. This provision of Dublin III allows migrants to bring
their families to the EU after receiving asylum protection. Filling out these forms involved a
significant amount of time and close to 100 EUR to pay taxes and the law office. These forms
could take weeks or months to go through the proper government offices to allow reunification.
This normally meant migrants regularly came back to see Giulia to ask how things were coming
along. Giulia (who is of Sicilian descent but was born in the US) had good relationships with
several of her clients and often the prices for services were negotiable. On more than one
occasion, someone brought her in a gift to thank her for her services in lieu of cash payment.

Figure 7 A sign outside the legal office advertises services available to migrants. Photo credit:
Adam Kersch

However, like in Umberto I and at ARCI’s offices, the strain caused by migrants’
constant waiting was evident. Multiple times clients became flustered, stressing that their
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families were still in very dangerous situations in their country of origin. One woman, Cutiyo,
and her daughter came in on a quiet day in the office to speak with Giulia about an ongoing
reunification process Giulia was involved with. Cutiyo had been waiting for the Italian
government to approve her husband to come to Italy. She spoke quietly to Giulia, cradling her
young daughter. I could hear a few words, as the office was essentially one large room, but was
not sure if I heard correctly. After Cutiyo left, Giulia told me that militants in Somalia had shot
the woman’s husband five times in the head the night before. The tragedy was even more
significant given that Cutiyo’s husband was evidently only a few days from being brought to
Italy to finally be reunited with his wife and daughter. Giulia mentioned several times before that
the Italian government, particularly the local Sicilian government, was very slow to process
paperwork. This was the first time during my fieldwork that I saw very direct and tragic
consequences to the extra temporal displacement migrants and their families faced.
Several other people I spoke to at the office faced ongoing frustrations about paperwork
they had submitted to the government. Some were apparently legally in the country, but needed
to wait to have the official permit, the permesso di soggiorno (“residence permit” in Italian), to
help them find work and to avoid having to carry about their folders of paperwork that proved
they were in Italy legitimately. A man from Eritrea in his mid-20s, Desmond, told me on my first
day in Siracusa that getting work documents was particularly difficult. Desmond had been in
Italy for the past seven years, with the exception of a brief time in Austria. As soon as he had his
EU passport, he confessed, he was leaving Italy and going to the UK or the US. The work
available to him in Italy paid poorly and was often physically difficult.
A few clients, however, had become what Giulia labelled as “successful” in Siracusa. A
man from Somalia, Ahmed, had been in Siracusa for roughly five years and had managed to
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adjust relatively well to life in Italy. He dressed and spoke like native Italians (stressing to me
that he spoke Sicilian Italian, not Standard Italian) and had been working at the same job for a
few years. Ahmed was the only person I met in Siracusa who seemed to have found the vision of
Europe he had been seeking. The fact that Giulia described him as successful was telling of
perhaps what is necessary to achieve this dream. By conforming to Western standards of dress,
speech, and work, he found himself in a respected position. I noticed this was a general trend.
Migrants who came in dressed like local Italians and speaking fluent Italian were the
“successful” ones. It seemed that to a certain extent, success meant removing every possible sign
of “otherness.” Migrants could not change the color of their skin, but they could change their
dress and manner of speaking. In many ways, this conforms to colonial ideas of race and power.
“Whiteness” is seen as inherent success and thus the “whiter” migrants can make themselves, the
closer they are to “success.”
One could make the argument that labeling people like Ahmed as “successful” may have
to do with acquiring sufficient capital to support himself and dress well (thus conforming to
neoliberal ideas of success). Further, Ahmed’s conformity to Italian ideas of dress constitutes an
acquisition of a degree of social capital. Social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986:51). By following Italian
cultural norms, Ahmed invested in and possessed a type of capital linked to membership or
activity in a particular group – in this case, his clothes, manner of speaking, and economic
success. However, office workers never described migrants who came into the office who had
maintained dressing customs from their countries of origin, or migrants who spoke with
noticeable accents as being as successful as Ahmed was. Other migrants did not have the proper
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kind of cultural capital to succeed in Italy and thus the office workers did not recognize them as
members of Italian society. One can think of this as attempting to use the currency from his or
her own country when visiting a foreign one. These ideas of “whiteness” or “Europeanness” as a
form of superiority are founded in Orientalist ideologies. Orientalism is a term used by Edward
Said to describe a set of epistemological assumptions about the “East” (including the Middle
East, North Africa, and India) that exoticize and essentialize the peoples and cultures of these
parts of the world. These ideas also have political implications, using ideas of the “exotic other”
to justify military intervention and other colonial activities (Said 1978). By defining success
through the ability to become increasingly European, Giulia is conforming to an orientalist or
colonial perspective that relates to a perceived inherent superiority in European culture. Such
colonial ideologies are apparent in how local administrators differentially treat migrants. The
most readily apparent example of this I observed was migrants’ interactions with local police.
This legal office was also relatively close to the local police headquarters, the questura.
This is where immigrants (including myself) had to go to get their documents approved so that
they could legitimately find work and accommodations. On Thursdays mornings when I walked
to the office, there was a sizeable crowd of people waiting outside the building so that they could
speak to immigration officials. Thursdays in particular drew a large group of people because this
was the day when migrants could speak to immigration officials without an appointment.
However, in order to get into the building, one needed to put their name on a list that could be
over one hundred people long. Migrants told me they had to come at three or four in the morning
to have their name be first on the list. However, this was not necessarily a guarantee of being the
first one in, as sometimes another person would come by, rip up the paper, and start a new list
with his or her name at the top. The questura often closed with several people still waiting
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outside for their appointments (as happened to me on one occasion). The police were very strict
about only letting a few people in at a time. When they opened the doors to announce the name
of the next person they would allow in, everyone flocked to the door to try to persuade the police
to let them in sooner, waving their documents in the air. Police did not respond kindly. They
shouted curses at the migrants waiting outside and once or twice in frustration, they did not call
any names and slammed the door in the waiting crowd’s faces.
Harsh words were not from police alone. The questura was on a street that had regular
traffic. Cars sometimes, but not usually, slowed to avoid hitting anyone in the road (when cars
did not slow, it likely had less to do with xenophobic or racial ideas and more to do with how
locals drove). One day while I was waiting for my appointment with immigration officials, a car
slowed to a crawl, then stopped next to a group of people I was speaking to. Briefly, the man in
the car addressed us, raised his voice, and then drove off. At the time my understanding of Italian
was limited (particularly my understanding of curse words and racial slurs) so after the car left, I
had to ask the Albanian, Somalian, and Iraqi men I had been talking to what the man had said.
The Albanian, Avni, who had been in Italy for ten years, filled in the gaps in my understanding.
The man in the car had asked why two white people were speaking with black people, using a
racial slur. Upon realizing that Avni was Albanian, the man in the car made a derogatory
comment about Albanians. After he saw that people were becoming understandably agitated, he
drove off.
Despite these moments of racism, I want to stress that how the police treated migrants
and how this man in the car treated migrants did not at all align with general attitudes from the
local people I met in Siracusa. People I spoke with casually at bars in Siracusa expressed
sympathy toward migrants, not only because of the conditions they fled but also because of how
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difficult their transition to life in Italy appeared to be. When migrants came into shops and
seemed to have difficulty understanding the difference between similar looking products (for
example, sparkling and still water), shop owners took the time to try to figure out what exactly
the person wanted. Shop owners and cashiers would also tell migrants if they could save money
by purchasing a particular product in bulk. For example, migrants would bring several smaller
bottles of water to the register and cashiers would suggest buying one or two larger bottles
instead to save money.
Given the innumerable obstacles that migrants face upon arrival in Siracusa, NGOs and
civil society provide an important means for migrants to exercise their right to internationally
mandated services that provide a foundation for their ability to establish a future for themselves.
In a neoliberal state wherein the government reduces public services in favor of encouraging
privatization, NGOs must often fill in this gap for marginalized persons such as migrants. The
bureaucracies of the NGOs end up becoming a new form of state, or a parallel state, given that
the Italian state provides increasingly few services to ensure the collective welfare or safety net,
but rather seems to direct much of its attention to economic activities with external bodies. As
noted by anthropologist Mark Schuller (2012) in his ethnography on NGO intervention in Haiti,
this opens many questions of accountability of the state to the society and corruption within state
structures. NGOs may feel obligated to carry out the wishes of their primary funders. While this
is also the case in government institutions, the government at least is elected by the populace (for
the most part) and not appointed internally. This model of provision of services seems to be an
open door to influences of neoliberalism. Those with the greatest amount of money will be most
capable of financing NGOs and may withdraw or deliver funding when NGOs actions align with
or deviate from their own beliefs and agendas. The people who are supposed to benefit from
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NGO services will unlikely be able to do much to influence the policies and practices of the
NGOs (who allegedly have their best interests at heart), as they cannot match the financial power
of these hypothetical donors. As a replacement for these fundamental state services, NGOs have
significant power in shaping people’s lives, but their on-going struggle for funding also puts
serious limitations on their ability to carry what should be the state’s responsibility of social
services to people within their borders. This is especially so in the case of marginalized
populations, such as migrants in Siracusa. I will now demonstrate the availability of these
services have a profound impact on migrants’ view of Europe, as well as on their goals for the
future.
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CHAPTER THREE: EVOLVING IMAGINARIES OF EUROPE AMONG MIGRANTS IN
SIRACUSA

Though the perspectives gained from analyzing policy documents and speaking to NGO
workers, state actors, and other local activists are vital in understanding how authorities receive
migrants in Siracusa, it is impossible for one to gain a holistic understanding of the process
without considering perspectives and experiences of the people who arrive and are the recipients
of these efforts. I will now analyze NGO workers’ perceptions of migrants and how migrants’
ideas about Europe match and diverge from these perceptions, how migrants’ perspectives of
Europe changed over time, how the migrant reception apparatus influenced migrants’ goals, how
the selective enforcement of migration policy emotionally affected people recovering from
traumatic circumstances, and living prospects for migrants who stay in Siracusa.
State healthcare providers as well as ARCI and Emergency’s NGO workers roughly
grouped migrants into two categories, “those who know” and “those who do not.” Although this
categorization is somewhat essentialist in nature, it is worth exploring and can build
understanding of the different perspectives that NGO activists hold while they interact with
migrants. I will present NGO workers’ conceptualizations of these categories of migrants and
subsequently discuss exceptions to these perceived patterns. While migrants’ experiences and
goals vaguely conform to NGO workers’ categorizations, there are of course individual nuances
and perspectives concerning why migrants have come to Europe and what they plan to do after
arrival. These plans also change in response to the experiences and obstacles they face after
being in Europe for some period. That is, NGO workers’ views on migrants’ goals are not always
an accurate representation of the individual realities of migrants’ lives.
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Migrants, regardless of their country of origin, largely come to Europe to seek safety and
new lives. Typically, these research participants told me they expected to find an environment
free of war and violence, as well as a chance for economic security. Western media stokes and in
part constructs these visions of Europe that that reach the Global South such as American
“reality” television shows, and in part by the promises of people smugglers, who often assure
people that they will undoubtedly have a secure future in Europe. Of course, these smugglers
have a vested interest in the perpetuation of these ideas, given that the journey across the
Mediterranean costs migrants I spoke to anywhere from 1,000-3,000 USD (those traveling
particularly long distances often pay significantly more – up to 10,000 USD as in one case that I
will discuss below). Some migrants paid this directly, while others agreed to work for a given
period in exchange for this trip in lieu of payment. According to Dr. Monti and several other
NGO workers, migrants have differing goals upon arrival based on their country of origin. These
two groups are broadly referred to as “those who know” and “those who do not know” about
economic difficulties in Italy. NGO workers said that migrants who were aware of these
difficulties arrive in Italy with no intentions of staying, while those who are unaware believe they
will find prosperity and safety in Italy.
Migrants from Syria, Somalia, and Eritrea are “those who know” because they are
typically aware of economic difficulties in Sicily and leave Italy as soon as possible. In most
cases, they arrive in Sicily and stay for a day or two before discreetly leaving the camp and going
to a train station. Dr. Monti told me “it’s rare for us to meet with [Syrians and Eritreans as
patients]. They stay one day, maybe two then they’re gone,” and added that this could be
frustrating for him as a physician. Because of migrant’s short stays, he is often unable to follow
up care to ensure migrants receive proper treatment. Dr. Monti also showed me statistics that
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Emergency had compiled. The nationality of arrivals, according to Emergency, is mostly Syrians
and Eritreans. However, the nationalities of patients treated by Emergency and those who stay in
the camp are typically from Sub-Saharan Africa. Syrians and Eritreans are not in the camp long
enough to seek medical care from Emergency.
According to Dr. Monti, the fact that Syrians, Eritreans, and Somalis are aware of
economic difficulties in Sicily is attributable to the long presence of migration routes from these
countries to Italy. These persons employ smugglers to continue to get through Europe after
arrival. They likely already have family or friends in Europe with whom they communicate. A
migrant from Eritrea, Musa, who had arrived the day before speaking with me, told me he
planned to leave Italy the next day. He had friends in the UK who had helped Musa coordinate
with smugglers to get to the UK undetected. He planned subsequently to find work. I was also
able to speak with a Syrian woman, Sarah, who was briefly in Siracusa en route north. My
conversation with Sarah was cut short when her father and family came and said they must leave
immediately for Milan and from there make their way to Sweden. Several NGO employees told
me that Milan is where migrants meet with the smugglers, who then take them further north.
NGO workers at ARCI expressed concern about these smugglers. Though they noted that these
smugglers could be of benevolent intentions, it is easy for migrants to fall into the hands of
human traffickers during this process. The labels “people smugglers” and “human traffickers”
refer to people who superficially seem to have the same goal: getting migrants to Europe.
However, people smugglers are those who are providing a service to migrants by assisting in
their illicit transport across international borders. Once the service is completed and the
smugglers are paid, the interaction is over. Human traffickers, on the other hand, are persons
who claim to offer similar services, but instead will sell migrants into the sex or drug trade.
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Human traffickers take advantage of the fact that since migrants usually do not have documents
(such as passports), there is no official record of them entering or leaving a given country. This
makes it significantly easier for traffickers to succeed in their attempts to sell migrants, as there
is no way to track their movements to see where they have come from or where they are going.
The Syrian, Eritrean and Somali refugees, or “those who know” as a result of personal
networks and are aware of economic difficulties in Sicily, have a markedly different imaginary
of Europe than “those who do not know.” Both groups migrated for essentially the same
reasons: fear of violence and/or lack of economic opportunities. However, “those who know” see
Europe as a haven and had hope for a better future there, and this conceptualization of Europe is
limited to countries such as Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. They do
not see themselves having a viable future in Southern Europe and thus migrate north.
The second category of refugees, conceptualized by the NGO workers as “those who do
not know,” about economic difficulties in Sicily, typically consists of Sub-Saharan Africans. In
interviews, recent arrivals spoke of dreams to begin learning Italian immediately and find work
or return to school. NGO employees perceive this group as less aware of economic difficulties
because of a shorter history of migration to Europe. Activists with Emergency and ARCI told me
these migrants stay in Sicily and Southern Europe for longer than “those who know” – Syrians,
Somalis and Eritreans. They seek employment within Italy but because of the dismal economy
often find themselves working illegally in agriculture where their managers severely underpay
them and migrants face harsh working conditions. A local state psychologist, David, echoed the
perspective of NGO workers, “Before it was political, ethnic, religious problems, but many
places have extensive poverty and people come. In addition, consumerism is a factor. [SubSaharans] come here thinking they will be rich.”
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Linguistic difficulties and xenophobia can also hamper migrants’ attempts to find work.
This situation – wherein migrants’ only option is to seek income outside the formal and thus
regulated labor market as a result of lack of legal documents, low economic opportunity, and/or
discrimination, is much like the situation faced by many of the sans-papiers (literally, “without
papers” in French, meaning undocumented migrants) anthropologist Miriam Ticktin (2011)
discussed in her ethnography Casualties of Care. In Ticktin’s ethnography, cycles of moving
from job to job to keep legal documentation, or work in the unregulated labor market to support
themselves and their families, catch migrants. These people constantly face the threat of
deportation. Consequently, Ticktin argues these conditions can be synonymous to slavery
because employers can essentially ask migrants to do anything; if migrants refuse, employers can
threaten reporting them to the police. This demonstrates that the conditions faced by migrants
have many parallels in other EU nations – suggesting a fundamental problem in legislation
and/or its enforcement. This evokes a marked shift in how migrants in the informal labor market
see Europe, as I will shortly discuss.
From conversations with migrants and local actors, I was able to discern that these two
groups of migrants had different imaginaries of Europe. Anthropologist Claudia Strauss (2006)
defines imaginaries as “cultural understandings … shared among people who have had the same
formative experiences despite living in different parts of the world and not having a common
identity” (2006:323). In other words, imaginaries are the ways societies and individuals
conceptualize the world because of “shared social practices and exposure to shared discourses
and symbols” (2006:326). For example, according to NGO workers’ categorization, the
imaginaries migrants from Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia (“those who know”) involve Southern
Europe being a place of transit rather than a destination because of poor economic opportunity.
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The imaginaries of “those who do not know” involve the entirety of Europe being a place of
opportunity. Consequently, in this group’s imaginary, Italy is as much of a goal as any other part
of Europe.
However, not all migrants conformed to one of these two categories. A few of the
migrants I spoke with had never intended to go to Europe. One migrant, Felix, left his home
country of Cameroon to find work abroad. He eventually found work in construction in Libya.
He told me that during Muammar Gadhafi’s reign, jobs were plentiful and the pay was very
good. Although Gadhafi 8 was a cruel and dangerous dictator, Felix told me that the country was
relatively stable. He was content with his life there to the point of rejecting an offer from his
brothers to come to Switzerland. After Gadhafi was deposed and as chaos escalated in Libya, he
felt he had no other option than to travel to Italy. Not only does Felix serve as an exception to
migrants intending to Europe, but Felix, being from West Africa, would also fall into the
category of “those who do not know” as a result of his nationality. However, Felix came to Italy
with the goal of getting to Switzerland to be with his family, showing an exception to this
conceptualization created by local actors. Further, migrants I spoke to from Pakistan did not
neatly fit into NGO worker’s categories. Two men I talked to came to Italy aware of the
difficulties and actively mentioned Germany was a better prospect, but did not leave Umberto I.
Consequently, migrants come to Europe with a spectrum of expectations and though there is a
general conformity to the trends that NGO workers told me, the categories are not concrete or a

8

Muammar Gadhafi seized power in Libya in 1969 and nationalized the country’s oil industry, quickly making the
nation rich and a place of economic opportunity for many in Africa as Gadhafi implemented strong social welfare
programs. He also founded his own political philosophy that was used to justify the oppression of the people of
Libya. Any person accused of questioning his rule or eccentric demands could be executed, tortured, or imprisoned.
During the revolution in Libya, he was executed by militants and the country tumbled into disorder (MacFarquhar
2011).
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guaranteed means of assuming patterns of behavior upon arrival in Europe. However, reception
conditions in Siracusa do motivate many migrants to leave Italy.

Figure 8 Migrants wait in line for cigarettes at Umberto I. Photo credit: Adam Kersch.

Those in Umberto I complained of inadequate food, lack of activities to occupy their
time, and that they border authorities only give migrants monochromatic athletic suits upon
arrival (see Figure 8 for an example of migrants waiting for services in Umberto I). Migrants
must dig in dumpsters to find more clothes. In fact, while walking around the outskirts of
Siracusa it was almost common to see migrants half immersed in dumpsters trying to find
articles of clothing to replace or supplement the worn out athletic suits authorities gave them
upon arrival. The only thing camp administrators gave migrants with any regularity was
cigarettes, which they distributed roughly once a week. Migrants told me, “It is not easy here”
multiple times during conversations with migrants. Another man from Gambia, Minteh, after
waiting for a month told me, “we came to Europe for our liberty but here we have no liberty; it’s
like we are in prison.” Lukas, a friend of Lamin, repeatedly told me that he felt his time was
being wasted in the camp. He wanted to learn Italian so he could find work and possibly go to
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school. His dream was to play soccer in Italy, but after three months in Umberto I, he was also
beginning to wonder if his prospects might be better outside of Italy. These pervasive narratives
are indicative of the entrapment migrants in Umberto I face because of selectively enacted
policies. I now will provide examples of these circumstances, demonstrating exactly how these
policies affect migrants’ attitudes and goals.

Again Northward Bound

Migrants ultimately come to Europe to escape structural violence as well as the violence
from war, ethnic conflicts, and other hardships, yet because of long waits and poor policy
enactment, few migrants arriving in Siracusa find the opportunity and security they sought. The
findings in this study show that because of reception conditions in places such as Umberto I,
migrants’ imaginaries of Europe change over time. The Sub-Saharan African migrants, or “those
who do not know,” generally see Europe, including Italy, as a haven. Upon arrival, many
migrants see Europe as a place of safety and opportunity and many individuals with whom I
spoke felt that “their futures” were in Italy. Markus, an 18-year-old migrant from Gambia, told
me that he came to Italy to finish his education. He had studied political science in Gambia, but
after his father’s death, who he suspects was killed for political reasons, he could no longer
afford schooling and explained that he came to Italy because he “[didn’t] want to feel hunted”
anymore. Jonas, from Senegal, told me he believed that in Italy he would be able to find a job
and make money to help support his family back home.
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However, after a week or two, this perception fades. Long waits in Umberto I, poor
reception conditions, and lack of legal information leads migrants to become increasingly
disillusioned with their futures in Italy. A 27-year-old man from Gambia, Lamin, who had been
in Italy for 3 months described the camp in the following way:
People’s physical needs, their social needs, and their basic needs in general are
lacking. Because the way they sign things, they said people should not live there,
people should not live more than 72 hours in that camp […] therefore they must
suffer because that was not the plan […] The food is a problem because this food
is designed for 72 hours. So if people are staying here for months […] the people
automatically must starve. And the clothing also is another problem […] if people
are staying there 72 hours you can wear one clothes, is not a problem. So if people
are staying more than 72 hours, therefore they cannot provide clothes for those
people […] it is the problem of the system.

Others I interviewed commonly echoed these general sentiments. Lamin and his three friends, all
“witnesses” for the state, became increasingly frustrated over time. Lamin’s quote above
demonstrates his understanding that there is a clear difference between the official policy and the
enacted policy. Lamin disclosed he wanted to learn Italian so he could find work and possibly go
to school. His dream was to play soccer in Italy, but after three months in Umberto I, he was also
beginning to wonder if his prospects might be better outside of Italy. These pervasive narratives
are indicative of the entrapment migrants in Umberto I face because of selectively enacted
policies. The longer Lamin was in Umberto I, the more he began to consider leaving Italy. The
three other men from Gambia he had befriended clandestinely left one by one until only Lamin
remained. He revealed that he was still in touch with his friends, who had safely arrived in
Germany, and confessed that the longer he stayed in Umberto I, the more he wanted to leave.
One day, he was no longer in the camp and I did not hear from him again.
Not only does seemingly endless waiting cause frustration and anxiety, but it can also
influence the health of migrants. For example, Lawrence, from Ivory Coast, who had lost his
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glasses on the boat en route to Italy, was unable to see well enough to read and worried this
would make it impossible for him to find any kind of work. Though Emergency had seen him
and processed a referral to a doctor, the STP program had not finished his registration. Lawrence
was very concerned that authorities would transfer him to another camp before he was able to get
his glasses. He waited almost two weeks before he could see an optometrist and finally receive
new glasses. During this wait, however, he was incredibly frustrated at his inability to see
properly and with his lengthy stay in Umberto I. One day he asked me when he might be able to
work, I said I was unsure, prompting his frustrated reply, “this is not enough for an ambitious
man like me.”
Lamin’s friend Lukas also faced delayed access to health services, but in two different
forms. Militiamen in Libya, who drilled two holes into his front teeth one night, had tortured
Lukas. He intended to seek medical care upon arrival in Italy, but was more concerned with his
legal status. His ongoing anxiety about whether or not he would receive papers led him to direct
most of his efforts toward speaking with ARCI, trying to see if his case had moved along.
Though the trauma to his teeth caused him significant pain, he felt his legal liminality was more
pressing. He was also worried that if he saw a doctor and received proper hospital care that he
might have to wait in Umberto I for even longer. I convinced him to talk to Emergency, who
entered him into the STP system. Like Lawrence, Lukas had to wait for his registration to
finalize, adding an extra week to his dental pain. Emergency finally took him to see a dentist,
who was able to repair his teeth.
Omar, a migrant from Afghanistan who had paid 10,000 USD to come to Italy, also
experienced hardships upon arrival:
It looks like everything is working, but inside there are responsible persons taking
a lot of money from the government, which is not giving you any kind of, any
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kind of facilities. Even a doctor, a pill. And if you ask them something, “dopo
domani;” it means “tomorrow or later,” about the pocket money, which is 75
EUR, which is nothing, for one month they give you 75 EUR in Sicily […] So
how can we survive in this situation? So these are the basic things, which they are
not even bother listening to you [sic].

Similar examples emerged in my fieldwork. For example, Omar had been in Italy for 3 months
and was living in a second reception center, where administrates still gave him the same sorts of
inadequate foods provided in Umberto I. Though he did not mention plans to leave, he felt
unsafe in Sicily and was unhappy with his life there.
A 20-year-old migrant from Pakistan, Raj, told me when he arrived at Umberto I in April
2015 that, because of poor job prospects in Sicily, he planned to travel out of Italy to Germany or
France with his friends after he received documentation. In June, two months after I met him,
authorities were finally transferring him from Umberto I, his home since arrival, to Milan. He
later disclosed via Facebook that the camp they transferred him to was worse than Umberto I.
Upon arrival, he had still not received documentation or notification about his legal status and
planned clandestinely to leave the camp to travel to Germany, as his friend had done days before.
Others explained they came to Europe with no intention of staying in Italy to begin with.
NGO workers told me that people from these countries often make use of smugglers within
Europe to get to their friends and families in Germany, the UK, or Sweden. I met only a few
migrants in Umberto I from these countries, and true to NGO workers’ predictions, they stayed
in Umberto I briefly and left. As detailed earlier, I spoke with one Syrian migrant, Sarah, who
had arrived with her father, mother, and brother. She revealed they planned to take the train from
Siracusa to Rome, then Milan, where they had a friend who would help them get to Sweden. I
asked an Eritrean migrant, Amanuel, if he would stay in Umberto I to wait for documents, but he
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had no intention of staying and like Musa, planned to travel north to unite with friends who left
Eritrea a year before.
Significantly, Sarah and Amanuel, the two migrants above, refused to provide
fingerprints to the Italian authorities in order to seek asylum in another EU country. Scholars
Marko Valenta, Drago Zuparic-Iljic, and Tea Vidovic (2015) observed similar activities in
Croatia, a new member to the EU and major transitory point for migrants traveling through the
Balkans to reach Western Europe. According to NGO workers in Siracusa, although the police
are legally obligated to demand fingerprints, they frequently look the other way when migrants
refuse to do so. Now, both nations face legal action from the EU because of failure to implement
properly this EU border policy (BBC 2015b).
Migrants have a variety of reasons for coming to Italy and different intentions and
ambitions upon arrival. However, the living and reception conditions in Umberto I consistently
lead to disillusionment and seem to produce an environment that encourages migrants to
clandestinely depart the camp to find better opportunities in other countries. Migrants must thus
travel again to seek the lives they thought they would find on the other side of the Mediterranean.
Europe, in the imaginaries of the migrants I met, changed from a place of opportunity and safety
to simply another set of borders they must cross to find a new life.

Life in Siracusa

I was able to speak to a handful of migrants who had successfully secured asylum in Siracusa or
who were in a nearby CARA (again, an Italian acronym that translates to “welcome center for
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asylum-seekers;” people in these centers have applied for, but not yet received, asylum). I met a
few of them in ARCI’s office, but the majority of migrants with this legal status I met at the
aforementioned legal office in Siracusa. Three main documents are key as migrants adjust to life
in Italy: residence, asylum, and work permits. Residence permits are permits for non-citizens that
certify an individual can legally live in Italy. Any non-citizen living in Italy must have a
residence permit. Asylum permits and work permits are types of documents that specify why an
individual is there and what rights they are entitled to. Asylum permits state that the individual
has received international asylum protection and can legally seek employment. Work permits are
documentation stating an individual is employed in Italy. Asylum permits cannot ultimately
result in Italian citizenship, while work permits can (that is, asylum permits must be
“transformed” into work permits by acquiring a job in Italy).
Legal residence in Italy seemed to have granted them little comfort. Given that asylum
permits are infinitely renewable for a predetermined period of time based on individual
circumstances (one, three, or five years), ideally, asylum-seekers find work and secure work
permits until they qualify for citizenship. However, for a variety of reasons, including difficulties
caused by the Bossi-Fini Law (as I explained in Chapter One: Italian Policy), migrants can have
a difficult time acquiring these work permits. Consequently, they must renew their asylum
protection to get documentation. NGO workers and migrants alike told me that commonly by the
time people receive their residence and asylum permits, they have expired, meaning they must
reapply and the documents they have are useless. This traps migrants in a perpetual cycle of
renewing permits and not having “proper” documents. The anxiety that migrants experience
continues even after they receive the long awaited decision on their legal status.
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I met Joshua in February, toward the beginning of my fieldwork at the legal office in
Siracusa. He had been in Italy for five years and traveled alone from Gambia. Even though he
had legal asylum, he had no documentation of his legal status and thus was unable to get medical
care. He came to the office to ask Giulia if she could help him get paperwork to see a doctor. He
had not seen a doctor since he left Gambia. While waiting to speak to Giulia, Joshua told me that
he expected a good life when he came to Italy, but he has “seen different [other] things.” Finding
a job had been difficult for him, and he was between odd jobs at the moment. “Do you feel safe
here?” I asked him while we were talking about life in Italy. He did not. He felt that the
government did not protect him from crime and instead had to protect himself. He did not
specify what this meant, but migrants I spoke with repeated these sentiments. Several people I
spoke with said that they did not trust the state to protect them. This was in part due to the
perception that the mafia had infiltrated every level of the local government. A man from
Afghanistan, Khalid, recounted an event where upon complaining about conditions in the CARA
in which he was living, an administrator pulled a gun on him, threatening to harm him if he
continued to complain. This story is difficult to verify, but it is telling of migrant’s perceptions
and expectations after living in Italy; it is particularly noteworthy given NGO workers’
accusations of the mafia siphoning money for migrants into their own coffers.
Another man, Anwar from Somalia, told me that he had good experiences seeking
healthcare in Siracusa, particularly at pharmacies, but a close friend of his had not. His friend,
Khalid, had “water in his lungs” and tried to seek care in Catania (a major Sicilian city an hour
and a half north of Siracusa by car). The doctors there told Khalid to go to Siracusa because he
needed surgery. He came to Siracusa and went to the hospital, where doctors told him there were
not enough beds for him. Anwar told me that apparently, a son of one of the physicians at the
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hospital had the flu and doctors gave him priority for the bed, despite the urgency of Khalid’s
condition. When he asked what he should then do, the hospital staff allegedly replied, “We don’t
give a fuck about what you do.” The friend came to Anwar to seek advice and Anwar directed
him to a man he knew was a retired doctor. Upon hearing the story, the retired doctor called the
hospital to protest, furious at this arrangement. The doctors at the hospital did not budge and said
that if the man needed the bed, he would have to speak to hospital management. The retired
doctor was able to speak with management, who promptly corrected the situation. Anwar’s
friend was in the hospital for two weeks until he recovered from what was apparently a lung
infection. Because of this story and others like it, Anwar confessed he did not feel comfortable
seeking a doctor and would only do so in an emergency.
On the other hand, Ala, also from Somalia, had come to Italy when he was legally a
minor. He had easy access to healthcare since he came to Italy and never had a problem when he
needed to see a doctor or get medication. Another migrant from Pakistan also told me had no
problems seeking medical care. Both of them, however, were having a difficult time finding
work. They also had proper documentation to be in Italy, but were “between documents,” with
one permit expired and waiting for another. There was no readily apparent reason for why these
three men had such different experiences and attitudes toward accessing medical care and this
likely comes down to personal experiences or attitudes instead of a larger thematic reason. What
can be said however, based on the experiences and perspectives of migrants and NGO staff, is
that health care services available to migrants are not consistent or timely. Additionally, the story
Anwar relayed is particularly troubling and hints at possible racism or xenophobia on the part of
physicians that aligns with other migrants’ experiences. Regardless of attitudes toward
physicians, the difficulty in accessing care is also troubling. Migrants were entirely unaware of a
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free clinic that operated once a week in Siracusa and provided medical services to anyone,
regardless of legal status. Further, the situation where migrants are caught “between permits,”
with the previous permit expired and the current one not yet in their hands, seems to have a
strong impact on migrants’ ability to access medical care and to even find work.
These vignettes bode ill for migrants who choose to stay in Italy. With only one
exception, even migrants with proper documentation did not want to stay in Italy. Instead, like
migrants in Umberto I, they wanted to go north, because they believed job prospects would be
better there. The anxiety of waiting for a decision on legal status seems to transform into anxiety
about finding a job or being able to access medical services. Slow processing times for migrants’
legal paperwork make both of these difficult. Chiara from ARCI told me that commonly it takes
over a year for migrants’ documents to come through after authorities grant them asylum.
Migrants’ “otherness” is visibly apparent. Their bodies serve to mark them as outsiders,
subjecting them to difficult communications with the police not only when they are going to
appointments to renew documents, but also when they are walking around the city. Several
migrants I spoke to, particularly Sub-Saharan migrants, said authorities had regularly asked to
see their documentation. During my six months in Italy, police only asked me for my
documentation once outside of my appointments at the questura. In a rare moment, I did not
have my passport with me, as I was supposed to get my residence permit in about a week. Before
they inquired after my circumstances, I simply told them I was a researcher from the US working
in Siracusa and I had forgotten my passport in my apartment. The officer took no further action.
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Requests to see migrants’ documentation seemingly rose after ISIS threatened to send
fighters among the migrants coming from Libya to conquer Rome (Wood 2015). 9 This event
increased paranoia towards migrants in general, as was most readily apparent in Umberto I
where police wearing shirts proclaiming them to be a part of an antiterrorism unit became a
routine. Further, the number of police as a whole seemed to increase during the course of my
fieldwork, particularly when new groups of migrants arrived in the camp. I asked workers with
Emergency why these anti-terrorist personnel were there, and they replied that they did not know
why and could only speculate.
Finally, it is worthwhile to describe the spatial orientation of migrant neighborhoods in
Siracusa in order to illustrate how migrants are separated from the local population. The main
tourist portion of Siracusa is a small island connected by a bridge to the rest of the city. This
area, Ortigia, is a tightly spaced network of apartments, alleys, and churches with a few large
main squares. Many of these apartments and buildings are well maintained and aesthetically
pleasing. However, these nicer-looking apartments are almost exclusively on the northern side of
the island. Much of the southern half of the island is somewhat run-down looking in many
places, with half-finished repairs, scaffolding, and cracked paint marking the majority of
apartments and buildings. This is the half of the island where migrants lived. Despite Ortigia
being overall a very beautiful area and drawing significant numbers of tourists, rent on the
southern half of the island is very inexpensive. This is likely because buildings as a whole were
in ill repair in comparison to those on the northern half of the island, but may also be due to
9

At this time during my fieldwork, ISIS was rapidly expanding the area under its control. Seeing Rome as a symbol
of Christianity or the West as a whole, capturing the Italian capital is major goal of ISIS’s declared war against
Europe. ISIS has established a strong presence in Libya, taking advantage of the nation’s anarchy to spread its
influence and involve itself with human trafficking by recruiting sex slaves, fighters, and making money from
migrants seeking passage to Europe.
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perceptions of this southern half of Ortigia as a dangerous place. Interestingly, this area is also
home to the only mosque in Siracusa. There is no visible façade; instead, the alleyways and
scaffolding that marks the buildings hide it. I walked by this building on an almost daily basis
and did not realize its function until three months into my fieldwork, when one of the NGO
workers asked me if I had seen it. The fact that the only mosque in the city is hidden in such a
manner is interesting given the large, ornate churches that dot the city. The NGO worker who
showed me the mosque astutely asked, “How is it that we can say we live in a place of tolerance
and equality when the only place Muslims can worship is hidden from the city?”
Locals I met told me the southern half of the island where migrants reside was dangerous
and cautioned me to be aware of my surroundings at night. The apartment in which I was in one
of the areas where locals told me to watch my back, although I never felt unsafe and never saw
anything remotely suspicious. In fact, I felt considerably safer walking around Ortigia late at
night than I have in the majority of cities I have been in the US and other European countries.
The majority of my immediate neighbors were, by appearance, migrants and not native Italians.
The neighbors that were Italian seemed to be of relatively low socioeconomic status and spoke
Italian with a Sicilian accent (Sicilian is a distinct language from Italian, though closely related),
one noticeable stronger than anyone else I met in Siracusa. Despite Chiara saying that Sicilians
have grown considerably tolerable toward the newly arriving people, this is one of the areas
where possible prejudices emerge in speech and practice.
Thus, through the locations of Umberto I, the mosque, and the homes of many migrants,
it is evident spatial arrangements keep migrants living in Siracusa out of sight. I mentioned this
once to Chiara, saying that it seemed the local officials are trying to hide this growing and
marginalized population. “That is exactly what they are doing,” she replied before saying that the
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majority of reception centers in Sicily are located on the outskirts of their respective cities.
Migrants again face exclusion from the local populations but are expected to “integrate” into
society. The migrants who do receive documentation seem permanently in limbo, waiting for the
next document. Because of issues with documentation, migrants living in Siracusa endure in
some circumstances more difficulties accessing medical services than those in Umberto I.
Further, those who end up living in Siracusa after going through migrant reception centers
spatially marginalized from the rest of the population.
Consequently, as migrants’ dreams of Europe are deflated by the harsh realities of
selective policy enforcement, slow government processes, poor economic prospects, and
exclusion from the general population, migrants “who do not know” cope by going North and
leaving Italy in hopes of finding the Europe of which they had dreamed. NGO staff confirmed
that as migrants’ imaginaries of Europe change, they are increasingly less inclined to stay in
Italy. This is apparently no secret to Italian authorities, who ignore migrants’ refusal to provide
fingerprints and openly encourage migrants to continue their attempts to clandestinely cross
borders into other European countries. Whether or not these results are intentional or simply a
“happy accident” of Italian policy remains a question.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION IN SIRACUSA

Findings in this research highlight thus far the effects of poor policy design and enforcement on
the experiences of entrapment and detrimental effects on health, during the asylum seeking
process. Anthropologists such as Sarah Willen, Jessica Mulligan, Heidi Castañeda (2011), Sarah
Horton (2004), and Merrell Singer (2009) have analyzed how social constructions of illegality
and deservingness have syndemic consequences for migrant health. These scholars and others
have argued that labelling some migrants as “illegal” constructs them as less deserving of
healthcare services. Italy is a peculiar example in that the constitution guarantees even
undocumented migrants the same access to healthcare services as Italian citizens. However, the
extra temporal and legal mazes that migrants must navigate to secure medical treatment and legal
documentation, in addition to anxiety caused from their legal liminality, demonstrates that
circumstances resulting from the implementation of healthcare policy to migrants in Siracusa in
many way conforms to the trends Willen, Mulligan, Castañeda, Horton, and others have noted.
Some migrants’ lack of trust in physicians is telling of how they conceptualize
themselves as vulnerable persons within the system. Despite the role of a doctor as an alleviator
of ailments, migrants’ treatment within the system leads to skepticism toward anyone they
perceive to be a part of it. This is in ways, a part of being designated as “undeserving.” Local
actors consistently deny migrants essential rights established by UN, EU, and the Italian
government guaranteed to them upon arrival. The fact that practice overrides these parts of
policy demonstrates a hypothetical deservingness on the part of migrants, but practice shows that
they are not.
This differentiation between policy and practice in border control in Siracusa constitutes
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what ethnographer Nancy Wonders (2006) refers to as the “performativity of borders.”
According to Wonders (2006:64), “border performativity takes as its theoretical starting point the
idea that borders are not only geographically constituted, but are socially constructed via the
performance of various state actors in an elaborate dance with ordinary people who seek freedom
of movement and identification.” In the case of migrants in Siracusa, actions on the part of the
state and local officials continue to bar migrants from the rights guaranteed by UN, EU and
Italian law. I argue that this keeps migrants, as undeserving subjects, outside the borders of
European rights. The dialectical relationship between migrants and officials’ actions creates the
borders in Siracusa and Europe that migrants must navigate and demonstrates that
socioeconomic and cultural aspects of borders policing are just as important, if not more
important than the geopolitical ones. As a result, migrants must work against “othering”
narratives and questions of deservingness in order to gain legal protection in Europe.
The only way migrants can become “deserving” is through proving that they have
suffered adequate hardship to be afforded international protection. As demonstrated by Giordano
(2014), such proof often must fit into and be constrained within pre-written state narratives.
Indeed, in several counseling sessions with migrants, I saw lawyers at ARCI “coaching”
migrants about how to present their stories so that they could fit into the state’s preconceptions of
suffering. Migrants’ stories had to place them as victims of persecution via race, sex, social
group, nationality, or religion. If their narratives did not neatly match one of these categories,
activists at ARCI encouraged migrants to be progressively less specific about the conditions they
fled, knowing that authorities sometimes deny protection to those deserving it. Not only do
asylum categorizations ignore structural violence by excluding persons migrating from West
Africa and the Middle East for economic reasons, but the process also consists long waits and a
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lack of clear information, putting migrants in a place outside time. This stands in contrast to
Italian citizens who, simply as a result of their jus sanguinis citizenship, or citizenship by blood,
are entitled to quicker access to healthcare services and the labor market and operate within the
same temporality as society as a whole.
The temporal displacement of migrants - as observed by Andersson (2014) on the
Moroccan/Spanish border - is also a hallmark of the Italian context, where displacement reflects
the transitory nature of migrants in Sicily. By-products of the Italian immigration system, such as
a sluggish healthcare access, extended legal liminality, and delays in entering Italian society,
seem to encourage migrants to flee Italy to seek out new lives elsewhere. Consequently,
temporality functions indirectly as a tool of the state, wherein migrants are discouraged from
staying, and after leaving, are no longer Italy’s “problem.” This is evident in the ethnographic
vignette presented in Chapter One, wherein Italian border police repeatedly urged Abraham to
continue his attempts to leave Italy and clandestinely cross the border into France. Italian
migration policy implementation and lack of opportunity encouraged Abraham to leave to seek
better opportunities outside the country, while border authorities overtly told him to keep trying
to leave. These temporal displacements are only one of several displacements that migrants face
after arriving in Europe. This process as a whole is a product of various meta-level forces that I
will now discuss.
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The Role of Neoliberalism in Migration and Borders

The temporal, spatial, and legal exclusions migrants in Umberto I experience are a result
of borders’ default constructions of non-citizens as undeserving, or in this case less deserving, of
health services. Such exclusions at home in neoliberal ideologies, increasingly adopted in the
global economy, that cut social services and further marginalize vulnerable populations.
Neoliberalism, as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free
trade,” (Harvey 2005:2) encourages privatization and as a result discourages public services
provided by the government such as public healthcare, welfare, and general infrastructure.
Austerity measures in Europe put into action after the financial crisis of 2008 are firmly rooted in
these ideas, suggesting that governments can get out of debt by reducing public services and
encouraging outside private investment.
Yet, those at the bottom rungs of society most often utilize these services, who lack the
funds to seek unsubsidized (private) versions of these services. Consequently, the poor provision
of services to migrants could be an extension of these ideologies, and raise important questions
about how dominant approaches in economics produce ever increasing social inequalities. The
Italian government assigns less priority to offering efficient health and legal services, financial
assistance, and a decent means of living than to encouraging “free trade” and economic
expansion. In other words, neoliberalism sees the free market as the solution to economic and
social problems alike, while the growing population of migrants remains at the periphery of such
markets, and receives little benefit from these services and changes.
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Specifically, borders, “[establishing] multiple points of control along key lines and
geographies of wealth and power,” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:7), are tools of the neoliberal
and capitalist agenda; they function as “frontiers of capital” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:5) that
maintain a differential flow of goods and labor between nation-states, supporting international
power structures. The nationalist undertones of denying, limiting, or reducing services to
foreigners experiencing hardship are also embraced in neoconservative rhetoric that is building
in Europe as Islamophobia and xenophobia stokes discourses of the outsider, the polluting
“other,” accused of destroying the integrity of the nation-state and in this case, the integrity of
“European culture.” Hence, neoliberal and neoconservative elements complement each other; the
former justifies reduction of public services and the exclusion of migrants, while the latter
provides an explanation for why this is necessary.
The anxiety and frustrations migrants experience because of this constant state of
liminality combined with exclusion constitutes a form of “social death,” following sociologist
Claudia Card (2003:63), as migrants seek safety and legitimization through asylum from the
state. Card argues that social death manifests in the “major loss of social vitality […] and
consequently a serious loss of meaning for one’s existence.” After the agentic activity of
crossing North Africa and the Mediterranean, the border reception apparatus stymies migrants’
efforts, and thus, the purpose of their journey seeking freedom from violence or economic
marginalization is nullified as they wait for the local authorities’ decision whether or not the
person has “truly” fled in fear of his or her life. To deny asylum is consequently rendering the
person’s claim that they escaped from violence as illegitimate. Migrants often experience this
“social death” further when they are unable to send money back to their families. As noted
above, before arriving in Europe many migrants expect to find a comfortable standard of living
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and an opportunity for socioeconomic mobility. However, when migrants are unable to find jobs,
they are unable to or have difficulty supporting themselves, much less their families outside of
Europe. A few migrants I spoke to mentioned the shame associated with what people back home
may perceive as failure. This again, causes a kind of social death vis-à-vis their families and
communities of origin.
The political action of accepting or denying asylum and “illegal” migrants in general is
part of the process of temporal restrictions on migrants and neoliberal regulation of the labor
market. As Karl Marx (1867) observed, migrants are part of the “reserve army of labor” for
capitalist economies. Andersson (2014) and Mezzadra and Nielson (2013) elaborated on this
concept and argued that temporal controls of this population allow the state to let migrants in
when necessary for the capitalist productivity of the nation-state and restrict their mobility when
it is not useful. Collectively, these experiences of migrants seeking asylum and new lives in
Europe constitute a “border struggle.” That is, a “set of everyday practices by which migrants
continually come to terms with the pervasive effects of the border, subtracting themselves from
them or negotiating them through the construction of networks and transnational social spaces”
(Rodríguez 1996, cited in Mezzadra and Nielson 2013:13). Border struggles are therefore the
experiences of migrants along borders and the navigation of the political economy of borders.
Migrants in Umberto I must endure the long wait times and strategize by seeking legal help from
NGOs or by feeling the camp entirely as they maneuver through the web of cultural, political,
and economic factors that compose borders.
The provision of healthcare and legal services to migrants in Umberto I is a peculiar
example of border struggles in that these services are legally a right of any person on Italian soil
(including undocumented migrants). However, I have demonstrated that practices along these
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borders and the enforcement of this policy stymie this access. Because of poor communication
between reception centers in Italy and the fact that migrants do not know when they will be
transferred (and thus cannot prepare records or a plan of continuing care), the possibility of
receiving adequate medical care is hampered. Further, the absolute lack of legal counsel inside
Umberto I despite migrants’ right to such services is another example of how migrants must
navigate and negotiate borders to secure their futures. Migrants are far from passive actors,
however and their responses to these forces change over time in relation to their own goals and
desires. Consequently, I will now explore the relationships between agency and post-colonialism
in migrants’ experiences in Siracusa.

Agency and the Post-Colonial Encounter

In addition to neoliberal contexts, conflicts between post-colonial attitudes and forces,
and migrants’ agency mark their experiences upon arrival. I argue that the departure of many
migrants from Italy to other EU nations is emblematic of migrants’ shifting conceptualizations of
borders within Europe and is also an agentic strategy and functions as part of “the contestation of
the border practiced daily by subjects in transit” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:25). As
anthropologist Sherry Ortner (2006:143) has outlined, “in one modality, agency is closely related
to ideas of power, including both domination and resistance; in another it is closely related to
ideas of intention, to people’s (culturally constructed) projects in the world and their ability to
engage and enact them.” This secondary migration within Europe is therefore a form of projects,
in this case their desire to achieve a safe and economically viable future, and may also be seen as
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a form of resistance to a global economic system that has placed millions of people into
disadvantaged circumstances as a result of neoliberal economic policies that fuel inequities or
political instability and violence. Hampered by an oppressive environment, migrants depart their
home country to rebuff their lack of opportunity and undertake further projects within Europe,
rejecting the local system that yet again constrains their potential for action.
Further, the goals of local political actors affect migrants’ futures. The situation in
Siracusa is reminiscent of Miriam Ticktin’s (2011:127) research on legality and healthcare for
immigrants in the suburbs of Paris, wherein she observed that “while law always involves
interpretation, and while it is enacted in specific contexts that help determine its meaning, the
difference here is that the law’s production and execution become indistinguishable.” In
Siracusa, local officials’ own enforcement of laws becomes the law itself; the production of law
is superseded by and indistinguishable from its practice. Migrants do not have the opportunity to
initially come to Europe as free persons and to seek their futures as they please. Instead, they
must comply with a slow and labyrinthine legal apparatus put in place by a variety of bureaucrats
who face pressure from a largely unknowable set of influences. The goals of these administrators
and bureaucrats may not be directly to oppress migrants, but instead to retain power. Thus,
conforming to Ortner’s assertions on agency, the excessive agency of a more powerful party
limits the agency of the marginalized. It is irresponsible to assume only malicious intent on the
part of administrators, politicians, and other officials. Instead, we must understand their actions
within the larger and infinitely complex web of relationships, ambitions, and responsibilities.
Policy makers and enactors’ choices are also constrained by the worsening European economy.
This does not mean that they are exempt from responsibility for the consequences of their
actions; instead, anthropologists and other researchers must continue to seek to understand the
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context and aims of these actions. Consequently, this highlights a gap in knowledge that offers
an opening for further research. That is, we must seek to understand what forces drive policy
makers’ actions in Siracusa and how (and if) they respond to migrants’ needs.
The selective enforcement of international and local policies by administrators in
Siracusa I have laid out demonstrates the interplay of complex array of economic, political, and
personal factors that in many cases, leads to the suffering of migrants. Indeed, the four levels of
violence proposed by Slavoj Žižek (2008) are readily apparent in the journeys and lives of the
migrants in Umberto I. The most visible form of violence is subjective violence, that is, violence
with a clearly identifiable perpetrator and victim. Migrants faced torture in Libya and danger in
their home countries that pushed them to seek asylum in the first place. Dangerous interactions
with people smugglers and the risk inherent in navigating through the Sahara Desert and
Mediterranean Sea also mar migrants’ journeys. Some migrants who have arrived in Europe have
also faced violence from local Europeans who have burned down migrant homes, assaulted
groups of migrants, and committed other acts of violence (Fernandez 2015; Hume and Yan 2016;
Martin 2015; Michaelski 2015). This, if course, is the form of violence that often receives the
most attention, as it is the most conspicuous form.
News articles informing readers of atrocities in Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, and other places
display this violence to audiences in the West, who often possess little first-hand experience of
the horrors and difficulties that many people around the world endure. This violence, normalized
through “language and cultural forms” (Žižek 2008:1) with generic phrases such as “war in the
Middle East,” and “starving children in Africa,” exoticizes the other and dehumanizes the
suffering of people in those areas. This is a form of symbolic violence, first described by Pierre
Bourdieu and later elaborated upon by Žižek, among others (Bourdieu 1984; Žižek 2008). In
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Žižek’s framing, symbolic violence, along with systemic violence, make up objective violence,
the violence that composes the standard against which we judge subjective violence. Systemic
violence (largely synonymous with Paul Farmer’s structural violence (2004)) is violence that
results from how the world “normally functions.” That is, violence endured by people who live
in countries that, because of neoliberal economic policies (along with a variety of other factors),
have a significantly lower quality of life and access to resources. The “normal function” of the
global economy itself is predicated on the exploitation of labor and resources from nations in the
Global South by those in the Global North, whose lifestyles are impossible without the flow of
relatively cheap “free trade” materials and the labor that assembles these materials into our cell
phones, televisions, cars, clothes, and other goods (Harvey 2007).
However, the structural violence migrants face does not end upon their arrival in Europe,
as I have demonstrated. Migrants facing long wait times, spotty access to healthcare and legal
services, poor economic opportunity, and other forms of suffering discussed earlier are not the
result of a clearly identifiable agent, but the outcome of structural or systemic violence. That is,
“violence that is exerted systemically - that is, indirectly - by everyone that belongs to a certain
social order” (Farmer 2001:307). Instead, the consequences of global economics and politics
affect the types of care that international organizations (here I include NGOs, the EU, and the
UN) and nation states provide to migrants while local actors, acting in their own interest, poorly
enforce policies designed to protect these migrants. However, it is not only the poor enforcement
of policy, but in some cases, it is the policy itself. Scholars critique the Bossi-Fini law as
trapping migrants in a system where they must have a work contract in order to have legal
documentation, but they also need documentation to obtain a work contract. This allows
employers to blackmail immigrants, since they are the ones who ultimately decide whether they
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will renew migrants’ employment contracts (Horvat 2015). Migrants I spoke to who had legal
residence in Italy reported difficulty finding work. Structures in place again function as mobile
borders, keeping migrants from accessing the labor market, in many ways reserving available
jobs for Italians or other Europeans.
The fact that the category “economic migrant” exists is in and of itself evidence of nation
states’ desires to regulate their internal economies through border politics. Interestingly, in the
case of the EU and the Schengen Area, laws allow people from less wealthy nations such as
Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia (soon to include Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania) to travel freely to
wealthier nations within the area and find work there. These are technically economic migrants,
but because they are within this agreement, nations permit their movement. However, persons
coming from even less wealthy nations such as Gambia, Somalia, and Pakistan, are not allowed
free travel for what authorities are legally stating is the same purpose (that is, to find labor).
Again, barring someone who is fleeing poverty to find a new life because they are not fleeing
from “real” violence is telling of neoliberal agendas within border policy and delegitimizes
migrants’ suffering. The geopolitical lines drawn around who is and who is not allowed legally
to seek labor – the mobile set of borders that constraints individuals’ available movement and
opportunities – in this case seem to imply an additional racial or cultural prejudice. Europeans of
a variety of nationalities (primarily Western Europeans, though increasingly Eastern Europeans
as well) are afforded these opportunities, while non-Europeans are barred from them.
As Bill Ashcroft et al. (1995:2) illustrate, “all post-colonial societies are still subject in
one way or another to overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination.” This is especially the
case when members of former European colonies return to former colonizers, where colonial
ideologies and justifications may persist, but which now manifested themselves in neo-colonial
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practices that manage and corral refugees, perhaps more effectively than previous means of
“hard” control through violent actions. By allowing migrants to seek asylum in Europe but then
separating them from society, the state is enacting a “soft” colonialism that constructs these
individuals as unworthy as a result of their legal status. Migrants, having endured violence and
hardships, must earn their citizenship through a series of legal steps that are, in Sicily, obtuse at
best. This again is a type of structural or objective violence exerted by the state and international
organizations.
These post-colonial encounters are further reproduced in the violence against migrants in
European countries, as narratives of the Other create and perpetuate xenophobic environments as
discourses paint immigrants with the recurring narratives of “danger” and “crime” (Horvat
2015). By this, I mean criminals both in terms of violence and theft, but also as “border”
criminals, people who defy international law by crossing borders clandestinely. Marked by their
race, geographical origin, language, and sometimes sex, migrants exist as an othered population.
Such categorizations cannot responsibly be divorced from historical power structures and
politics. Migrants’ bodies thus become a signal of their legal and socioeconomic status, marking
them for all to see as the (potentially “illegal”) other.
It is particularly interesting that European governments have decided to make acquiring
citizenship difficult and life uncomfortable for those seeking a future there. Colonial encounters
of the past have created the economic climate of the present, where the Global North, the global
economic core, exploits resources and labor from the Global South, or global economic
periphery. Wallerstein’s world systems theory has previously characterized these differential
power relationships (Harvey 2007, Wallerstein 1974). As stated by Anna Tsing (1993:326),
“marginal people become archaic survivors who, for better or worse, are forced to ‘catch up’
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with the twentieth century.” In the case of migrants in the Global South, this “catching up” –
seeking the same rights and safety enjoyed by the Global North – means fleeing the violence and
chaos of home to seek a new life in the West. The objective (or structural) and subjective
violence resulting from these relationships push migrants north into Europe, where governments
in turn decide whether or not these migrants are worthy of international protection.
Consequently, one could argue (and in fact, some NGO workers have proposed this assertion)
that Europe’s economic policy has helped create migrants abroad before they even leave their
respective nations’ borders.
Once migrants flee, European institutions further attempt to control the movement of
migrants. The media has accused Frontex, the border-patrolling agency of the EU, of letting
migrants drown by reducing their efforts to rescue them (Lind 2015). Additionally, Frontex has
ceased its efforts to reduce people smuggling into and on the borders of Europe. Although these
people smugglers are in some cases benevolent, they can be violent, exploitative, and force girls
and women into sex work (Adler 2015; Campbell 2016). These more recent events occur against
the backdrop of Frontex’s previous actions where they deported migrants before allowing them
to reach European shores, violating international law (Friese 2012; Klepp 2012; Nascimbene and
Di Pascale 2011). Although European policy makers publicly seem deeply concerned, and/or
outraged at the incoming migrants and the tragedies occurring at the borders, the organization
tasked with their protection seems function with the same confusing pattern of selective action
that marks Umberto I. The lack of effort on the part of Frontex suggests a very puzzling response
to the incoming migrants. It is difficult to tell if the goal of the organization is to reduce the
influx of migrants given the discontinuance of anti-smuggling programs, but reduced efforts to
rescue migrants seems to indicate as such. Perhaps the goal instead is to create a border
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environment that is simply intolerable. More likely, however, the persons designing and enacting
Frontex’s operations find themselves caught within a complex web of structure and agency,
wherein the tragic situations migrants endure on Europe’s borders are simply a side effect of the
goals of Frontex instead of a desired result.
Italian practice and policy, by providing spotty and lethargic services, seems to
discourage migrants from staying in the country. This is logical enough, given that migrants do
not typically want to stay in Italy and perhaps Italian politicians do not feel that they or their
citizens should be the ones to bear the social or economic burden. However, this does not seem
adequate of a justification for denying rights to migrants on social justice and human rights
grounds. Interestingly, migrants are indirectly encouraged (in fact openly by police, as noted
above in the case of Abraham) to go north to the countries that own much of Italy’s (and
Greece’s) debt and also were the main colonizing nations of the past, such as Germany, France,
and the UK. This is perhaps doubly karmic, not only because of these colonial pasts between the
Global North and South, but also because of the economic and political present between
Northern and Southern Europe. EU legislation such as the Dublin Regulation place the burden of
migrant reception on Southern European nations, which then, in the case of Italy, indirectly
transfer this back to Northern European nations.
Perhaps the violence most readily apparent upon migrants staying in Europe, and in
particular in Italy, is evident in the story of Cutiyo’s husband that I detailed above. While the
temporal displacement caused by slow immigration processes ensnared Cutiyo, her daughter, and
her husband, Somali militants shot Cutiyo’s husband five times in the head. This perhaps is a
story that best ties together the violence in the Italian migration process. Global economic
policies and colonial pasts that have in part pushed nations such as Somalia to situations
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characterized by piracy, militias, and endemic violence pushed Cutiyo and her daughter from
Somalia, while her husband was unable to escape.
After a dangerous journey to Italy from Somalia and waiting within the asylum system
and the inevitable difficulties this caused for her and her daughter (namely the anxiety and stress
all migrants I spoke with experienced), she filed for a family reunification so that her husband
could join her. Borders’ constructions of outsiders as undeserving outsiders made such a process
necessary instead of simply allowing her husband the freedom to be with his family. Again, it
was during this final wait that Cutiyo’s husband was murdered. It is in this story that we can see
the unification of consequences from meta-level forces such as history, economic policy, and the
politics of migration, more localized events in the violence from migrants’ temporal
displacement, and finally the subjective and immediate violence experienced by people living in
countries torn apart by violence.
Caught between these economic and political tensions are migrants who are seeking to
find a place where they may have a life free from violence and one where they can enjoy “human
rights” that seem to be disproportionately enjoyed by the Global North. These rights include
freedom of movement and from arbitrary detention of exile, the right to security of person, the
right to asylum, labor, and a healthy standard of living (United Nations 1948). This brings to
mind an extreme but pressing question. If the practices of the Global North do not allow those of
the Global South “human” rights, can the Global North truly say that its policy treats them as
human? This is an especially pertinent consideration when we remember that these concepts of
human rights stem in part from ideals born in the European Enlightenment (Eriksen 1997). It
thus comes across as hypocritical that the situation with migrants in Europe is as such.
Additionally, scholars of neoliberalism and post-colonialism are familiar with the fact that one of
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the main reasons those in the Global North have the ability to exercise these rights is the ongoing
economic exploitation of resources and labor in the Global South. Hopefully, with increasing
ethnographic literature and light on the topic, officials will adequately reform these policies in a
meaningful way that allows for genuine opportunity for migrants and other marginalized persons
in Europe.
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CONCLUSION

Since the end of my fieldwork in July 2015, there have been significant developments in
migration events in Europe, as hundreds of thousands of migrants pour into Greece and Italy in
their attempts to reach Germany, Scandinavia, or the UK. In response, Germany, Hungary (a
transitory nation and not a destination in and of itself), Austria, and Denmark have reinstated
border controls that harken back to the days before the Schengen Agreement, an act that before
these closures allowed effectively borderless travel between many Western and Central
European nations. Additionally, in February 2016, Austria began to limit the number of migrants
allowed into the country to 80 per day and began refusing to take in migrants who are not from
Iraq or Syria. This led to neighboring Balkan nations also to refuse passage through their
borders, fearing that migrants would begin to wait in the Balkans to get into Austria. As a result,
thousands of Afghan migrants were stuck on the Greek and Macedonian border and at the end of
the month, attempted to break the fence down and charge into Macedonia. Macedonian border
guards responded by firing tear gas into the crowd of migrants (Al Jazeera 2016). Only a few
weeks later, Macedonia closed their border to any migrants seeking to cross, stranding roughly
13,000 migrants in the Macedonian and Greek border. Serbia, Croatia, and Bulgaria have also
closed their borders to any irregular migrants seeking to travel through the countries, with
European Council President Donald Tusk brazenly responding to the situation by claiming that
“the days of irregular migration to Europe are over” (BBC 2016c).
All the while, the EU has been attempting to secure a political agreement with the
Turkish government that would allow Europe to send any migrants arriving in Greece back to
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Turkey. This comes in exchange for “billions [of Euros] in aid, visa-free travel for Turks in
Europe, and renewed prospects for [Turkey] joining the European Union,” (Arango and Yeginsu
2016). This offer comes after the Turkish government forcibly closed a newspaper posting
dissenting opinions about the government and responded to the resulting protests with tear gas
and water cannons. Consequently, Turkey seems to be benefitting from EU leaders’ desire to
prevent the arrival of any more migrants. Unfortunately, negative sentiments toward migrants are
not decreasing, particularly in the light of US General Breedlove’s (a senior general in NATO’s
European operations) recent accusation that Russia and Syria are “weaponizing” migrants,
misplacing massive numbers of people with the intention of increasing intra-EU tensions with
the hope of further destabilizing the region (BBC 2016d).
The cost of these practices is economic as well as human. In a recent research study, the
French government estimated that long-term costs to the EU for reinstating pre-Schengen border
policies could exceed 100 billion EUR. Those closed borders in Austria, Denmark, Germany,
and other countries have already impacted economic activity in the area, as shipping costs in the
region reportedly rose 30% due to the resulting increase in transport times from extra border
checks (Alderman and Kanter 2016). Further, declining and persistently low birthrates across
Europe are further fueling economic and demographic anxieties (Krause 2005, Mishtal 2009).
Italy in particular has experienced an ongoing drop in birthrate (Caltabiano et al. 2009). These
reductions may result from gendered discrimination in the labor market (in Poland, for example),
and an increase in education and autonomy among women in Italy. In these places in particular,
incoming migrants may help to ameliorate future shortages in the labor force and prevent further
deterioration in some other economies. On the other hand, declining birthrates among the Italian
nationals can also translate into an intensification of nationalist and xenophobic discourses due to
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often-higher fertility rates among incoming migrants and other minority groups, which depict
nations such as Italy as in a “demographic crisis.” Therefore, the on-going situation with
migrants in Europe is significant from not only the human rights and social justice perspectives,
but it also intersects with every other aspect of politics and economics.
As the international community looks on in horror at the consequences of the Syrian Civil
War and decades of structural violence and open warfare in West and East Africa, tens of
thousands more people will continue to brave the journey to Europe. As of March 1, 2016,
UNHCR reported more than 130,000 migrant arrivals since January 1st, with more than 120,000
arriving through Greece and 9,000 via Italy. It is worth noting that 34% of these persons were
children. This compares to roughly 12,000 arrivals in the same period of 2015 (UNHCR 2016).
These events show that arguments for policies limiting migration into Europe are ineffective, as
strict border policies of Hungary, Germany, and Denmark, as well as the elimination of Mare
Nostrum did little to stop people fleeing from violence and seeking asylum in these countries and
the rest of Europe. Consequently, increased apathy or disdain toward those seeking asylum and a
new life will likely cause the death of more persons in the Mediterranean and further difficulties
for nations at Europe’s borders rather than cease the influx of migrants.
From the perspective of human rights and policy concerns, collaborative action - both
horizontally between nation states, and vertically between a variety of policy and service actors is likely the key solution to the current crisis in Europe, a continent slowly dividing as Eurozone
politics leave many Southern Europeans feeling exploited by Northern Europe. Nathaniel Copsey
(2015:1), a scholar of EU Politics, describes the Eurozone crisis as an “assault on both the
positivist idea of Europe as the most effective means of responding to social, economic, and
political challenges and the normative ideal of Europe as the world’s most advanced, effective,
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and exciting experiment in international cooperation.” Lack of transnational cooperation will
only exacerbate such divides and sentiments. The people of Greece, Italy, and Spain face
economic hardship and devastation as EU policies simultaneously force them to withstand the
worst of one of the largest events of forced migration since World War II. As more inland
countries in the EU close their borders and restrict travel, this will likely intensify the stress the
border nations of the EU face.
The continued implementation of austerity measures by the European Central Bank in
Greece despite the nation’s near economic collapse in 2015 also indicate a worsening of the
situation. The riots and protests in Greece, as well as the people’s (ultimately ignored) vote
against austerity also suggest that negative sentiments between Northern and Southern Europe
will likely intensify. In fact, Eurobarometer polls showed that in 2013, 80% of Greeks and 61%
of Italians do not trust the EU (Copsey 2015). The EU’s threatened censure against Greece for
not appropriately protecting Europe’s borders is evidence of this. Additionally, this begs the
question: How can the EU as a whole expect its poorest nations to handle the over one million
migrants who arrived in 2015 when these migrants have no desire to remain there? Ironically,
migrants do not want to stay in Italy and clandestinely leave as a result of the poor economic
prospects in Italy and Greece created in part by austerity measures imposed by the European
Central Bank and the EU as a whole.
Further, as more migrants arrive in Europe, political divisions are becoming more
pronounced, as far right parties claim that such a mass influx of outsides will threaten their
respective nation’s “identity” and European “culture,” while leftists become increasingly
frustrated by growing austerity in the face of a prolonged economic downturn (Žižek 2015).
Leftist scholars have warned that “it is precisely the neoliberal path of the EU, with austerity
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measures and structural adjustments, which is leading to a permanent civil war, not only outside
of European borders, but also inside of the EU, from Greece and Spain, to Slovenia and Croatia”
(Horvat 2015b:87). Thus, Europe is facing a moment where economic, political, national, and
racial tensions are rising to the surface. Greece, currently experiencing dire social and economic
circumstances, is emblematic of these tensions. SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής
Αριστεράς; the Coalition of the Radical Left), a self-described far-left party, currently has
control of the Greek parliament; the far right party, Golden Dawn, threatens violent actions
against migrants, painting them as the dangerous “Other.” All the while, the average Greek
citizen lives in an increasingly insecure economic environment (Žižek 2015). Likely, the citizens
of nearby European countries wonder if they will face a similar fate as tensions within the EU
intensify and as austerity policies continue. The Polish and Hungarian people have recently
elected right-leaning parties with strong anti-immigration platforms, and similar parties are
gaining momentum elsewhere in Europe.
However, it would be naïve to believe that fixing policies in Europe will alleviate this
unprecedented migration crisis. Terrorist activities across Africa and the Middle East by Al
Shabab, Boko Haram, Islamic State, and others, despotic rulers in nations such as Gambia, and
lack of economic opportunities may continue, raising questions about the role of the international
community in these struggles. Likewise, the recent attacks in Brussels, Paris, Lebanon, Egypt,
Turkey, Tunisia, Yemen, and the “IS-inspired” attacks in California highlight the urgency of the
escalating and intertwining hardships and violence (Yourish et al. 2015). It is vital to consider an
international agreement to take in refugees and asylum seekers in order to stymie human rights
violations and suffering, particularly in the Global South. However, there might also be a
positive side to the flow of migrants. As Croatian philosopher Srećko Horvat (2015:96) said, “If
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there is no contact with the Other, the possibility of understanding and learning is greatly
reduced.” Perhaps these interactions between those from inside and those from outside the West
will lead to an increased understanding and level of empathy across Europe that may lead to a
more compassionate international politics and social environment. Moreover, as workers at
ARCI suggested, exposure to people of different backgrounds and life circumstances may
generate compassion and greater tolerance. In fact, I hope that this research may increase
awareness of migrants’ situations in Europe and at best, inform policy. It has thus far changed
practices for Emergency in Umberto I as they now provide more information about legal rights
and opportunities for counseling to migrants (as I will discuss briefly below).

Contributions and Future Research

This research contributes to the anthropology of migration, refugees, and human rights
and serves as a base for future projects. Anthropologists and other social scientists have a unique
capability of providing nuanced and intimate depictions of human experience. Ethnographic
research strongly based in the on-the-ground experiences of migrants and local actors must
inform policies that aim to ameliorate this situation. In situations such as these, where
government activities do not adequately address the needs of a crisis, NGO activities and
perspectives are also crucial in effective provision of essential services such as healthcare and
legal services, as well as driving policy reform. However, ethnographies such as Casualties of
Care by Miriam Ticktin (2011) and Migrants in Translation by Cristiana Giordano (2014)
remind us that we must be aware of the potential for the reproduction of colonial interactions and
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relationships when offering services to migrants. Ethnographic data provides a means to explore
and deconstruct the existing practices and discourses in order to better understand and address
the growing phenomenon of en masse migration to and within Europe and to effectively
administer necessary services to those in need.
Part of my agreement with Emergency was that I provide them with a summary of my
findings from my research and send any papers where I mention their activities. While
conducting research, I had the opportunity to present my findings at that point at a conference for
the International Society of Ethnology and Folklore (SIEF) in Zagreb, Croatia. I sent a copy of
the paper I presented to Emergency and was able to hear their reactions and feedback to my
observations. In that paper, like in this thesis, I demonstrate the difficulty of access to legal
services for migrants in Umberto I. Emergency workers at Umberto I told me they decided to
address this problem by providing more detailed information about ARCI’s legal services to
migrants who sought services from Emergency or asked them about their legal outlook.
Hopefully, this will help migrants have greater awareness of their status as persons within the EU
and may alleviate some of the psychological stress involved with seeking legal residence.
Emergency is aware of the problems associated with the lack of psychological support and care
for incoming migrants and workers have told me the organization is trying to eliminate this
problem by including psychological specialists in their operations.
While at the SIEF conference, I met Francesco Vacchiano, an Italian anthropologist
specializing in migration in Europe based at the University of Lisbon. Francesco chaired the
panel on which I presented and provided valuable feedback on my research, including questions
I should ask my interlocutors upon returning to Siracusa after the conference. Part of this
feedback was suggesting I paint a less gloomy picture of migration in Europe than I had in the
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presented paper and focus more on the good that organizations such as Emergency and ARCI do
for incoming migrants. I hope that this thesis has adequately highlighted the strengths of the two
organizations’ work to help migrants in Siracusa, and contributes a more nuanced representation
of the challenges and successes of these advocates.

Future Research

This thesis marks the beginning of an ongoing research project. I plan to return to
Siracusa May 2016 to see first-hand how the situation with migrants has evolved, particularly in
light of recent events. I will conduct this research as part of my pre-doctoral work based at the
University of California, Davis, under the supervision of Cristiana Giordano, a medical
anthropologist working with refugees in Italy. I plan to continue to explore how migrant policy
affects migrants and how local actors enforce these policies. The improvement and adoption of
new policy is irrelevant if local officials continue to disregard international and Italian law at the
expense of people fleeing violence. Further, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants, in
addition to being a human rights crisis, has placed strain on the idea of what it means to be
“European.” How do Southern Europeans conceive of their identity as Europeans as austerity
continues to affect Southern Europe while EU legislation places a disproportionate burden on
countries at the borders of Europe? How do Europeans reconcile their conceptualization of living
in the birthplace of democracy and human rights as an unprecedented human rights crisis occurs
on their soil? If Europeans consider themselves to be from the place that gave rise to these ideas,
will the deconstruction of a “European” identity lead to a decreased interest in providing
humanitarian aid to marginalized populations?
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These questions have serious implications for how Europeans will receive incoming
migrants in terms of willingness to provide aid and asylum for those escaping from war and
poverty. These unfolding events also have consequences for the global economy, in which the
EU is a major player. The Eurozone as a whole, united by currency, collectively bears the
economic results of this mass migration and the moral responsibility of each nation state’s
response to it. Attempts to provide services for migrants may further stretch the resources of
nations whose governments and people are already in an economically precarious situation. If the
EU ejects Greece or other border nations from the Eurozone, responsibility for the protection of
Europe’s borders will only shift to other states. Policy makers must be mindful that people
migrate because of push factors and not pull factors. If there is violence and poverty, there will
be people seeking a better future.
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Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I’m Adam Kersch from the University of
Central Florida, and I’m the Principal Investigator for the research project, titled: “Asylum in
Crisis: Understanding Healthcare Provision to Refugees in Siracusa, Sicily.” Before I interview
you about your experiences with and insights into refugee healthcare services, I would like to
give you a short survey. All of the information you give me will be confidential. The survey is
voluntary and it will take between 5 and 15 minutes.
I would like to start now; is that OK?
Date: _____
Interviewee Number/Pseudonym:_____________________________
Before I interview you I would like to establish some basic information. I am going to ask a few
basic questions about your experiences.
Q1: Which country did you live in long-term before arriving in Sicily?
a:
____________________________
Q2: Did you travel alone or with somebody from your home?
Alone _______ Not alone ______
If not alone, then who?
a.
Relative
specify: _________
b.
Friend/s
c.
Other __________
Q3: How long was your trip?
a.
1-3 months
b.
6-9 months
c.
9-12 months
d.
Over a year
Q4: Which countries did you travel through on your journey?
a:
__________________________
Q5: How long have you been in Sicily?
Less than a week
1-3 weeks
2-5 months
6-12 months
Over a year
Thank you very much for your time. Please don’t hesitate to contact me if there’s anything else
that you would like to add that you have not had a chance to say during this interview. Here’s
my contact information.
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